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ABSTRACT
UNDERLYING PROCESSES OF ANTISOCIAL DECISIONS: ADOLESCENTS
VERSUS ADULTS 
By
Kathryn L. Modecki 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2007
The question of adolescent decision maturity holds significant ramifications for 
today’s youth. When adolescents are viewed as competent, rational decision 
makers, they may be considered mature enough to make decisions in their best 
interest in criminal court (Grisso, 1997) and may be held fully culpable for their 
crimes. In contrast, when adolescents are viewed as immature decision makers, 
they may be considered less competent to make criminal decisions, and thus 
may not be considered fully blameworthy for their crimes (Woolard, Reppucci, & 
Redding, 1996). The present study is based on responses to hypothetical 
vignettes and measures maturity of judgment (Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995; 
Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996) via standardized scales and qualitative analyses of 
open-ended responses. This work investigates the relations between maturity of 
judgment, consequential thinking, and participation in delinquent behaviors in 
adolescents (ages12-18), adults (ages 35-63), and delinquent youth (ages 14- 
17). Results suggest that adolescents and adults differ significantly on the 
judgment factors that influence their decisions and their decision processes. 
However, adolescent within-group differences stemmed from the outcome
xiii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
expectancy that sensation seeking was a reason TO engage in antisocial 
behavior, and from differences on consequential thinking variables. In all, 
findings suggests that for adolescents, but not adults, the domains most central 
to the endorsement of antisocial decisions are outcome expectancies related to 
peers, sensation seeking, negative emotion, short term benefits, lack of risk, and 
over-emphasis on said positive expectancies. Further, exploratory analyses 
showed external validity for the study’s qualitative coding. Taken together, the 
results of this study offer the potential to inform adolescent-focused legal policies 
and interventions.
xiv




Are adolescents mature decision makers? Research that attempts to 
answer this query provides a lens through which a society views its adolescents. 
(Jacobs-Quadrel, Fischhoff, & Davis, 1993; Steinberg & Lerner, 2004). This 
tension is perhaps most perceptible in criminal contexts. When adolescents are 
viewed as competent, rational decision makers, they may be considered mature 
enough to make decisions in their best interest in criminal court (Grisso, 1997) 
and may be held fully culpable for their crimes. In contrast, when adolescents 
are viewed as immature decision makers, adolescents may be considered less 
competent to make criminal decisions, and thus may not be considered fully 
culpable for their crimes (Woolard, Reppucci, & Redding, 1996).
At present, both research and legislation offer a mixed view of adolescent 
maturity. Although traditional cognitive theory posits few differences between 
adolescents and adults (e.g Inhelder & Piaget, 1958), Social Information- 
Processing theory suggests that younger individuals show deficits in their 
cognitive problem solving (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Further, more recent 
developmental theories of immature judgment emphasize psychosocial 
influences on decision making, positing that adolescents and adults may differ on
1
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factors that influence their decision processes (Cauffman & Steinberg, 1995, 
2000; Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996). This 
notion is supported by physiological research (Spear, 2000; Yurgelun-Todd, 
2002) and studies of adolescent decision making in risk-laden contexts (Furby & 
Beyth-Marom, 1992).
In light of the potential implications in the policy arena attached to 
adolescent decision research, this review argues that adolescents and adults 
differ both in their decision processes and in the psychosocial factors that 
influence their decisions in antisocial domains (Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman, 
2001). The current review aims to elucidate these differences, as well as the 
psychosocial factors which may influence adolescent antisocial decisions, and 
makes suggestions for theory and future research.
Definitions
Adolescence is often referred to in terms of phases, including early (age 
10 to 14), middle (age 15 to 17), and late (18-mid 20’s) stages (Elliott & Feldman, 
1990). The present review focuses on the middle adolescent period, based on 
extensive findings of differences in decision making abilities between 
adolescents younger than 15 and adults across decision domains (e.g., Gittler, 
Quigley-Rick, & Saks, 1990; Grisso,1997). Because middle adolescents are on 
the cusp of legal adulthood, their legal rights are perhaps the most tenuous. At 
the same time, middle adolescents are in the precarious position wherein their 
physical maturity may mask their developmental immaturity in decision making 
contexts (Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996).
2
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Decision making has been defined as the process of evaluating options 
and making a choice based on the likelihood of a consequence’s occurrence and 
expected utility (Beyth-Marom, Fischhoff, Jacobs-Quadrel, & Furby, 1991;
Galotti, 1989). Policy makers, in particular, may be tempted to evaluate 
adolescent decisions in terms of what adolescents choose, their decision 
resolution, herein defined as decision outcome (Friedman, 1996). Yet in order to 
asses decision making ability, research must also consider the deliberation 
procedure used to arrive at a decision outcome, herein defined as the decision 
process (Friedman, 1996). For instance, adolescents may be deficient 
processors of social-information, based on lack of experience or on psychosocial 
influences on decision processes. These factors may bias adolescents towards 
diminished negative outcome expectancies and augmented positive outcome 
expectancies for antisocial behavior (Fontaine, in press).
Further, policy makers may look to evidence of adolescent abilities to 
make good decisions under ideal conditions, such as within the context of a 
laboratory, as evidence of maturity (Scott et al., 1995; Woolard et al. 1996); yet 
decision making capacity does not equate with decision making performance 
(Fischhoff, 1992; Grisso, 1986). Adolescent decision performance, everyday 
decision processes made within social and environmental contexts must be 
evaluated for competence, rather than laboratory-based tasks that assess 
decision outcomes (Woolard et al.).
Recent developmental research suggests that adolescent decision 
performance may be influenced by situation-specific features, such as peer
3
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
influences, risk perception, and shortened future-time perspective (Woolard et. 
al, 1996). This contextual approach is the immature judgment perspective (Scott 
et al., 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996), which focuses on adolescent 
susceptibility to psychosocial influences within particular decision domains. The 
immature judgment paradigm is distinct from more macro-based cognitive theory, 
which attempts to draw broad-based conclusions of over-all decision competence 
(Woolard et al.).
Criminal Responsibility
The current direction of the legal system is lead by the assumption that 
adolescents are mature decision makers (Walkover, 1984), as seen in the over 
200,000 adolescents tried in adult criminal court annually (Allard & Young, 2002). 
With an upsurge in criminal transfer through offense and prosecutor discretion 
laws, it becomes a foregone conclusion that adolescents are, in fact, rationally 
choosing their crimes (Gardner, 1989).
To be held fully criminally responsible under law, one must willingly 
engage in a criminal activity and, while doing so, possess a guilty or “criminal” 
mind set (Weithorn, 1984). Traditionally, it was assumed that individuals ages 14 
and below could not possess a guilty mindset, although evidence to the contrary 
would be evaluated in specific cases (Weithorn, 1984). This analysis is known 
as the infancy defense, akin to the adult defense of insanity, compelling a 
reduction in punishment (Bonnie, Coughlin, Jeffries, & Low, 1997). However, 
infancy is a non-allowable defense in juvenile court (Bonnie et al.), because the
4
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system exists to accommodate the notion that juveniles are less mature than 
adults, and thus less culpable for their crimes (Scott & Grisso, 1997).
When adolescents are transferred to adult court, the infancy claim is no 
longer extraneous. Although it is often assumed that criminal courts consider 
adolescent immaturity as a mitigating factor (Slobogin, Fondacaro & Woolard, 
1999, Steinberg & Cauffman, 2001), research suggests that this is not the case 
(Scott & Grisso, 1997). In fact, juveniles transferred to criminal court may be 
punished more severely than young adults for similar crimes (Kurlychek & 
Johnson, 2004). For example, research suggests that judges may view 
transferred adolescents as more culpable for their crimes than adult defendants 
(Kurlychek & Johnson. 2004).
At the same time, if adolescent antisocial decisions are characterized as 
lacking mature, rational choice, the notion of “adult time for adult crime" is 
undermined (Scott et al., 1995; Woolard, Fondacaro, & Slobogin, 2001). In fact, 
adolescent’s immaturity when making antisocial decisions advocates for reduced 
criminal responsibility in adolescents (Woolard et al., 1996). Yet scant research 
has directly addressed the question of adolescent criminal culpability (Fried & 
Reppucci, 2001; Woolard et al.). Consequently, law makers and theorists have 
relied on a broad-spectrum of decision making research to understand 
adolescent criminal responsibility (Scott & Grisso, 1997).
Despite the clear suppositions made by current legislative policy, scant 
research exists to elucidate questions of criminal culpability in adolescence 
(Fried & Reppucci, 2001; Woolard et al., 1996). Yet without mature, rational
5
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choice, adolescents should not be held as accountable for their crimes as adults 
(Woolard et al.). The current project seeks to fill this critical gap in the research 
literature by investigating differences in adolescent and adult decision processes 
in criminal contexts.
Cognitive Abilities
Traditional cognitive theory suggests few differences between adolescent 
and adult decision making (Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002; Moshman & Franks, 
1986). At the cornerstone of cognitive-developmental concepts, Piagetian theory 
suggests discrete, gestalt-like stages of cognitive development, which indicate 
adult-like thinking in early adolescents (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). For instance, 
between ages seven and eight the panultimate stage of cognitive development, 
concrete operations (Piaget, 1971), suggests that reasoning becomes more 
logical and organized, and thinking is portrayed as more akin to adults than to 
children (Berk, 2006). Further, starting at age 11, the final stage of cognitive 
development, formal operations (Piaget, 1971), suggests capabilities for 
hypothetical-deductive reasoning, including the generation of hypothetical 
alternatives (Ayers, 1971).
Cognitive development is no longer thought to occur in gestalt, linear 
stages (as discussed in Fischer & Silvern, 1985; Gardner, Scherer, & Tester, 
1989; Strauss & Clarke, 1992), nor to encompass all domains concurrently 
(Flavell, 1982). Further, research suggests that adults seldom operate at the 
formal operations level of reasoning (Keating, 1990). In fact, much cognitive 
research suggests that both adolescents and adults often deviate from normative
6
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decision standards (Fischhoff 1988; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Adults are 
susceptible to judgment biases (Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2005), and are by no 
means the criterion for rational reasoning (Gittler et al., 1990; Halpern-Felsher & 
Cauffman, 2001).
Yet contemporary cognitive theory continues to underscore developmental 
progression in decision capabilities (Gopnik, 1996; Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2005). 
Neo-Piagetian theories propose that individuals advance from instinctive decision 
processes to analyses that are more reasoned and rational. Further, information 
processing perspectives posit improved decision efficiency with age (Gopnik, 
1996; Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2005).
Nevertheless, current cognitive research provides evidence of adolescent 
and adult similarity under ideal conditions (as discussed in Jacobs & Ganzel,
1993 and Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002). For instance, research suggests that 
adolescents and adults are comparable in their use of inferences (Jacobs & 
Narloch, 2001) and heuristics (Krouse, 1986; Jacobs & Potenza, 1991). Yet 
adolescent decision performance in real-life contexts likely diverges from such 
laboratory-based findings (Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002). Indeed, the hallmark of 
the adolescent period is the unique physical, social, and environmental contexts 
in which individuals find themselves (Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996). In particular, 
adolescents are exposed to different social contexts than adults, and may 
evaluate consequences differently based on increased peer influence, decreased 
perception of risk, and decreased future time perspective (Scott & Grisso, 1997).
7
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Social Information-Processing
Social information-processing (SIP) theorists have attempted to 
understand decision making in social contexts (Crick & Dodge, 1994). In 
particular, Dodge and Crick’s (1990) model of “on-line” decisions may explain 
differential adjustment in children and adolescents (Crick & Dodge, 1994). 
Researchers posit that, with age, children should become more adept processors 
of social information (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Further, the strength of association 
between social information processing and observed behavior may increase with 
age (Crick & Dodge, 1994).
The refined SIP model, advanced by Crick and Dodge (1994) posits that 
individuals employ different “mental steps” in response to a given social cue. 
These steps include: (1) encoding of cues, wherein an individual attends to 
internal and external cues (2) interpretation of cues (3) clarification of goals (4) 
response access or construction (5) response decision, wherein an individual 
evaluates potential responses, including outcome expectations and self-efficacy, 
and (6) response enactment. The current review focuses on steps four through 
six of the SIP model.
Differences in aggressive and non-aggressive children have been found 
on all steps of the SIP model, including steps four through six: response access, 
response decision, and response enactment. In terms of response access (Step 
4), aggressive children generate fewer assertive and more aggressive responses 
than non-aggressive children (Feldman & Dodge, 1987; Weiss, Dodge, Bates, & 
Petit, 1992). In addition, in a short-term intervention for incarcerated aggressive
8
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adolescents, Slaby and Guerra (1988) found that individuals who received 
decision training generated more solutions and more consequences to 
hypothetical provocation events than untrained adolescents.
Further, research shows a relation between aggression and outcome 
expectancies (Step 5): expected consequences are related to verbal (Crick & 
Ladd, 1990) and aggressive behavior (Hart, Ladd, & Burlseon, 1990; Slaby & 
Guerra, 1988). Aggressive adolescents (Slaby & Guerra, 1988) and children 
(Boldizar, Perry, & Perry, 1989) diminish negative consequences of aggression. 
Aggressive youth also expect that positive consequences are associated with 
aggressive behavior (Crick & Werner, 1998; Deluty, 1983; Guerra & Slaby, 1990; 
Lochman & Dodge, 1994; Perry et al., 1986; Slaby & Guerra, 1988). In addition, 
aggressive children expect aggression to be more successful in acquiring 
rewards, and in decreasing aversive peer treatment than non-aggressive children 
(Perry et al.). Aggressive children are more confident in their self-efficacy for 
aggression than non-aggressive children, as well (Perry et al.). Finally, in terms 
of response decision (Step 6), aggressive children endorse aggressive 
responses more often and assertive responses less often than non-aggressive 
children (Feldman & Dodge, 1987).
Adolescent Social Information-Processing
Few researchers have included adolescent samples in studies of SIP, 
although the function of aggressive strategies on behavior may increase with age 
(as discussed in Crick & Dodge, 1994). Indeed, research shows that older youth 
generate more solutions to interpersonal problems (Step 4), but may not differ
9
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from younger youth in their outcome expectations (Step 5). For instance, in a 7 
year follow up of children as adolescents (ages 17 and 18), aggressive versus 
non-aggressive participants differed in their actual use of problem solving 
strategies (Keltikangas-Jarvinen & Pakaslahti, 1999). However, this difference 
was seen only in adolescents. Although age-differences have not been found in 
terms of outcome expectations for aggression (Lochman & Dodge, 1994), this 
lack of difference may be based on measurement issues, as described below. 
Indeed, future research would benefit from a focus on age-based differences in 
outcome expectations, as children, adolescents, and adults experience different 
psychosocial contexts, such as peer influence, that would likely affect decision 
processes (Fontaine, in press).
Measurement
Researchers have been quite consistent in their approach towards 
assessment of social information-processing steps (e.g. Weiss et al., 1992; 
Quiggle, Garber, Panak, & Dodge, 1992). For example, in Step 4, response 
search, participants are often asked what responses they might consider in 
reaction to a hypothetical vignette. In Step 5, response evaluation, different 
responses (e.g. aggressive, non-aggressive-inept, and competent) are often 
presented. After each response, participants are asked to rate presented 
outcomes, from very bad to very good. Outcome expectancies often include the 
presentation of several responses, and participants are asked to indicate their 
level of confidence that a particular consequence will ensue. Finally, in Step 6, 
enactment, participants are often shown three different possibilities of how they
10
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could respond to the story, and are asked to choose. Alternatively, participants 
are asked what they would do in response to the story.
However, in terms of outcome expectancies, it may prove more useful to 
measure consequential thinking via open-ended, as opposed to response- 
recognition formats (Hart et al., 1990). For example, when aggressive boys are 
asked to select response options from a provided list, they choose different 
selections than when they are asked to spontaneously generate responses 
(Lochman, Lampron, & Rabiner, 1989). Thus, selecting options from a provided 
list is likely a measure o f deliberate, as opposed to automatic responses 
(Lochman et al., 1989). Yet only a minority of studies (e.g. Guerra, 1989; Slaby 
& Guerra, 1988) have assessed outcome expectancies in an open ended 
manner, and this research neither investigates age-differences, nor codes for 
psychosocial content.
Thus, future research would particularly benefit from a focus on age-based 
differences in the social information-processing step of outcome evaluation. 
Further, this research should include open-ended response formats, which are 
thought to measure salient, automatic responses (Lochman et al., 1989). Finally, 
consequence responses should be coded for psychosocial content, based on 
differential contexts of adolescent decision making, as discussed below.
Immature Judgment Theory 
Adolescent decisions are likely influenced by a number of contextual 
features that are unique to their developmental period, and that may help explain 
observed differences in adolescent and adult decision making (Scott et al., 1995;
11
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Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996). These psychosocial influences include increased 
peer influence, increased risk propensity, and decreased future-time perspective, 
among others (Scott et al.). Although adults may experience these psychosocial 
factors, adult decisions are thought to reflect their own choices and preferences, 
whereas adolescent choices may not (Steinberg & Scott, 2003). The term 
“maturity of judgment” has been coined to reflect the influence of such 
psychosocial factors on the cognitive decision process (Cauffman & Steinberg, 
1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996). A number of psycho-legal theorists have 
argued that middle adolescents, in particular, are unduly affected by these 
decision factors in real-world contexts, resulting in immature judgment as 
compared to adults (Scott et al.).
Little empirical work has investigated immature judgment in relation to 
antisocial decisions, with some exceptions (e.g. Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; 
Fried & Reppucci, 2001, Steinberg et al., 2003). Original empirical research on 
immaturity of judgment focused on the effect of psychosocial variables: 
autonomy, independence, emotional temperance, future-time perspective, and 
perspective of others, on antisocial outcomes, finding evidence that immature 
judgment strongly affects antisocial choices (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; 
Modecki, in press). Further, this research suggests that beginning in 10th grade 
(age 15), immature judgment peaks, and then dissipates with age (Cauffman & 
Steinberg, 2000).
More recent research operationalizes maturity of judgment with the more 
specific dimensions of peer influence, increased risk propensity, and decreased
12
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future-time perspective. However, only a single study has investigated any 
maturity of judgment factors in relation to criminal decision processes, as 
opposed to outcomes (Fried & Reppucci, 2001). This work measured perceived 
risks, benefits, peer influence, and consequence in detained and non-detained 
adolescents, with results suggesting age differences only in terms of appraisal of 
risk. Because this work was based on a small sample size and lacked an adult 
comparison, it is likely that a more extensive study would find evidence that 
adolescent decision processes are affected by all three psychosocial influences: 
peer influence, risk propensity, and future time perspective. Indeed, such 
developmental differences were seen on the standardized maturity of judgment 
measures of future time perspective and risk perception.
Peer Influence
Research on adolescent development suggests that, in an effort to assert 
autonomy (Douvan, 1974), adolescents shift from reliance on parents for 
decisions to reliance on peers (Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986). More over, 
adolescent risk behavior may be bolstered by such peer support (Jessor & 
Jessor, 1977).
Laboratory research on adolescent susceptibility to peer influence, based 
on Asch’s (1951) design of group perceptual decisions, suggests a curvilinear 
trend, with vulnerability peaking between ages 11 and 12, and then dissipating 
(Berndt, 1979; Costanza & Shaw, 1966; Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986).
However, other research has found evidence of greater risk taking in high school 
students versus young adults (Hensley, 1977), and has established the crest in
13
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peer influence at a later stage, between ages 14 and 15 (Brown, Clasen, &
Eicher, 1986). This later finding parallels studies of adolescent antisocial 
behavior, which suggests that adolescents generally make antisocial decisions in 
groups (Erickson & Jensen, 1977; Zimmiring, 1981), and that the age-curve in 
offending apexes between ages 15 and 16 (as discussed in Gottfredson &
Hirschi, 1990).
Susceptibility to peer pressure requires not only conformity, but also a 
perception of peer norms to which one should adhere. Researchers have 
routinely found that adolescents’ risk behaviors are predicted by their perceptions 
that peer norms endorse offending (Kuther & Higgins-D’Alessandro, 2003;
Martens, Page, Mowry, Damann, Taylor, & Cimini, 2006; Martino, Collins,
Kanouse, Elliott, & Berry, 2005; O’Donnell, Myint-U, O’Donnell, & Stueve, 2003).
In fact, popular adolescents are more likely to adhere to perceived peer norms 
favoring delinquent behavior (Allen, Porter, McFarland, Marsh, & McElhaney,
2005; Allen, Weissberg, Hawkins, 1989). At the same time, a developmental 
trajectory exists in which adolescents perceive peer norms as most encouraging 
of risky behavior in early adolescence (Gillmore et al., 2002).
Risk Propensity
Adolescence is typically characterized as a time of increased risk taking, 
from unsafe driving (CDCP, 2004) to unsafe sex (ASHA, 2005). Adolescent 
propensity towards risky behavior has been explained in terms of both increased 
sensation seeking (Arnett, 1994; Zuckerman, 1979), and in terms of decreased risk
14
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perception (Caffray & Schneider, 2000; Lavery, Siegel, Cousins, & Rubovits,
1993).
Increased sensation seeking, as typified by Zuckerman (1979), suggests 
that individuals attach greater importance to the novelty and complexity of risk 
(Arnett, 1994), and are thus more likely to engage in risk behaviors. High 
sensation seeking has been associated with a number of antisocial behaviors 
(Hovarth & Zuckerman, 1993; Perez & Torrubia, 1985). Moreover, sensation 
seeking has been found to escalate over the course of adolescence (Crawford, 
Pentz, Chou, Li, & Dwyer, 2003; Zuckerman, 1994). At the same time, research 
on adjudicated adolescents suggests that sensation seeking is moderately 
associated with diminished risk perception (Robbins & Bryan, 2004)
Adolescents may also engender a diminished assessment of potential 
negative consequences associated with decisions (Cauffman, Woolard, & 
Reppucci, 1999; Jacobs & Ganzel, 1993; Mann, Harmoni, & Power, 1989; 
Nightingale & Fischhoff, 2002). Research based on young adult samples in 
comparison to adolescents shows significant age-group differences in risk 
perceptions, in that young adults rated negative outcomes as least probable, 
followed by older adolescents, with pre-adolescents rating negative consequences 
as most probable (Millstein & Halpern-Felsher, 2002). Other research that focused 
on adolescents’ and their parents’ perceptions of their own potential harm also 
found age-based differences (Cohn, Macfarlane, Yanez, & Imai, 1995). This work 
shows that adolescents perceive less potential harm than adults, and that these
15
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
differences are most pronounced in experimental, as opposed to regular, risk 
contexts.
Theories of increased sensation seeking and decreased risk perception are 
not mutually exclusive (Furby & Beth-Marom; 1992; Scott et al., 1995). Instead, 
each facet of risk perception may affect different aspects of the decision 
processes. For instance, increased sensation seeking may cause an adolescent 
to view the inherent risk associated with a decision as benefit, as opposed to a 
cost. At the same time, a decreased perception of risk may cause an adolescent 
to discount potential negative consequences of a decision (Scott et al.).
Future Time Perspective
Future time perspective has been defined in terms of both cognitive 
extension (Nurmi, 1987), the period in time over which one forecasts future 
thoughts, and cognitive-motivation, the pattern of consideration of more distal 
consequences (Lessing, 1972). Both perspectives, cognitive extension (as 
discussed in Greene, 1986) and cognitive motivation (Lessing, 1972; Nurmi, 1987), 
have been found to increase with age. Further, lengthier cognitive extension has 
been associated with the ability to delay gratification (Klineberg, 1968); whereas a 
shortened future time extension has been associated with delinquency (Barndt & 
Johnson, 1955).
It is likely that adolescent future time perspective varies in relation to social 
and environmental influences, in that research investigating age-based changes 
has found no association with Cognitive abilities, such as formal operational 
reasoning (Greene, 1986). Further, contextual influences such as identity
16
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formation, cultural orientation, and family environment have been shown to 
influence future orientation (Nurmi, 1991), and future time perspective has been 
positively linked with increased experience (Greene, 1986). Thus, in a review of 
future orientation, Nurmi (1991) argues that future orientation may be a 
consequence, as well as a cause of risky situational contexts.
Future time orientation has also been linked to socioeconomic status, with 
lower SES related to more proximal future orientation (Lamm/Schmidt, & 
Trommsdorff, 1976). The finding is suggestive, and parallels research that 
decreased optimism for the future is associated with limited future time perspective 
(Teahan, 1958). Indeed, future hopelessness has been associated with increased 
risk taking (Hill, Ross, & Low, 1997). Thus at-risk adolescents may show 
decreased future time perspective, which can be partially explained by their 
perceived lack of future hopeful prospects.
Physiological Research
Recent physiological research supports the notion that the adolescent 
decision process differs significantly from that of adults. For example, brain 
maturation between adolescence and young adulthood has been spatially and 
temporally mapped using MRI imaging. Findings suggest that the adolescent 
brain (ages 12-16) has yet to fully develop in the frontal lobe region, and may not 
mature to adult capacity until the early twenties (Sowell & Jernigan, 1998). This 
research shows that the brain is significantly remodeled during adolescence, 
which may lead to increased emotion in information encoding and decision 
making (Spear, 2000; Yurgelun-Todd, 2002). The adolescent pre-frontal cortex,
17
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an area involved in goal-directed behaviors and emotional processing, is altered 
appreciably during this time (Spear, 2000). In addition, the frontal lobes, a region 
typically utilized by adults for decision processing, may not reach full maturity 
until the early twenties (Davies & Rose, 1999). Adolescents may utilize the basal 
ganglia as a surrogate for decision processing (Yurgelun-Todd, Killgore, & 
Clintron 2003). This area, part of the amygdala, is frequently associated with 
emotion.
As adolescent physiological development favors more emotional 
processing, such changes may well be associated with the immature judgment 
factors of increased peer influence, decreased perception of risk, and decreased 
future time perspective. Indeed longitudinal research is currently underway that 
attempts to link these two developmental trajectories (T. Grisso, personal 
communication, March 9, 2006).
Decision Making
The tension between findings of cognitive competence in adolescent 
decision making and findings of developmental differences in social information- 
processing and vulnerability to psychosocial influences underscores the 
importance of domain based research. Indeed, cognitive research highlights the 
notion that maturation is likely domain-specific (Flavell, 1982). Adolescents may 
engage a range of decision making capabilities, depending on the social and 
environmental context.
Although few decision making studies directly compare adolescents and 
adults (Gardner et al., 1989), or investigate illegal decisions, beyond aggression
18
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(Fonataine, in press; Fried & Reppucci, 2001), hypotheses can be drawn from 
the existing decision literature. Analysis of this work centers on the substantial 
empirical evidence surrounding adolescent risk decisions. Although risk 
decisions have been investigated primarily through an epidemiological lens, such 
work is germane to antisocial decision research because both entail harmful 
negative consequences, are associated with high levels of excitement, and occur 
in the contexts of peers.
Antisocial Decision Making
Adolescence is a time of increased risk for criminal behavior (Hirschi & 
Gottfredson, 1983), as the offending age curve shows crime rates topping out 
during late adolescence and early adulthood, followed by a prompt decline (as 
discussed in Gottfredson & Hirshi, 1990). In fact, most adolescents are thought 
to participate in at least some rule violating behavior, such as drug use, 
vandalism, or petty theft (Moffitt, 1993). Thus theorists have often considered 
some degree of criminal behavior to be a distinctive component of adolescent 
development (Baumrind, 1987; Moffitt, 1993).
Although empirical work implicates immature judgment in delinquent 
decision making (e.g. Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; Modecki, in press), scant 
research has investigated how factors of immature judgment might affect the 
criminal decision process. Indeed, in a recent study, Modecki (in press) 
compared adolescent, college student, young-adult, and adult individuals on 
maturity of judgment factors and antisocial decision making in varying 
consequential contexts: no negative consequences, definite negative
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consequences, and uncertain negative consequences. She found that 
adolescents were significantly more likely than college students or adults to 
endorse antisocial choices in situations wherein definite consequences were 
certain to occur. Making an antisocial decision when it is known that negative 
consequences will definitely result may be considered the least “rational” or 
“mature” choice available. It is unclear whether this decision is based on a failure 
to consider negative consequences, an underestimation of such consequences, 
or an over-emphasis on positive consequences. Thus, the remainder of this 
review applies immature judgment theory to relevant dimensions of adolescent 
criminal decision making.
Relevant Decision Making Dimensions
Relevant research that does investigate psychosocial influences on 
adolescent decision processes is found primarily within public-health and 
psychological literatures on risk taking (see Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992). This 
literature is relevant to criminal decisions based on the similarity of contexts, 
such that both risky and illegal decisions are likely to be similarly affected by 
immature judgment. In fact, risky and illegal choices have been conceptualized 
as different aspects of a more general problem behavior variable (Jessor, 1992). 
Thus, risk decision research provides a useful framework for investigation, 
suggesting a number of decision making dimensions that may be associated with 
criminal behavior. This framework posits differences between adults and 
adolescents on each of the following dimensions, all of which fall within steps 
four through six of the social information-processing model: perceived incentives
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(Arnett, 1992; Lightfoot, 1997), perceived loss potential (Cauffman et al., 1999; 
Lewis, 1981), reward structures (Lopes, 1987; Moore & Gullone, 1996), depth of 
processing (Byrnes & McClenny, 1994; Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002), and 
generation of response solutions (Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992).
Perceived Incentives. Past research has measured perceived 
consequences of risky behavior and has found a psychosocial orientation to 
adolescent responses (Beyth-Marom, Austin, Fischhoff, Plamgren, & Jacobs- 
Quadrel, 1993). For example, positive consequences associated with risky 
behavior likely include both increased excitement and peer acceptance. In 
addition, social information-processing research shows an association between 
peer influence and outcome expectancies that endorse aggressive behavior.
First, past research on involvement in risky behaviors suggests an 
association with both sensation seeking and perceived benefits (Rolison & 
Scherman, 2003). This work, based on college students, finds that sensation 
seeking is most predictive of students’ risk behaviors (Rolison & Scherman,
2002). Along the same lines, longitudinal research has found that adolescent’s 
‘fun’ ratings of behavior predict their subsequent risk involvement (Maggs, 
Almeida, & Galambos, 1995). Longitudinal work based on college students 
shows similar results, suggesting that perceived benefits of risk actions is 
associated with predicted behavior involvement (Parsons, Siegel, & Cousins, 
1997).
Similarly, within their reward structures, adolescents may emphasize peer 
approval in committing risky acts. For instance, past research shows that boys
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(Miller & Byrnes, 1997) and adolescents (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005) are more 
likely to take risks when peers are present than absent. Likewise, Jessor and 
Jessor (1977) found that risk-taking adolescents perceive greater peer support 
for their behavior and greater peer involvement in risk behavior than non risk- 
taking adolescents. Further, other work shows that college students’ perceptions 
of peer involvement in risky acts are most predictive of their own involvement 
(Rolison & Scherman, 2003). In addition, longitudinal research has found that 
adolescents’ problem behavior is significantly related to peer’s acceptance 
(Maggs et al., 1995).
At the same time, SIP research has found some evidence for psychosocial 
incentives in relation to aggressive behavior. For instance, in step five of the SIP 
model, aggressive delinquent adolescents (Slaby & Guerra, 1988) but not 
aggressive children (Perry et al., 1986) identify peer approval in their outcome 
expectancies for aggressive behavior. This finding is in-line with the maturity of 
judgment perspective, underscoring adolescents’ increased susceptibility to 
psychosocial factors in comparison to both children and adults. However, SIP 
research has not explicitly investigated contents of outcome expectancies in 
relation to judgment factors such as risk perception, including sensation seeking, 
and future-time orientation. Thus, future research would benefit from the content 
coding of outcome expectancies for psychosocial judgment factors, particularly in 
antisocial contexts extending beyond aggression.
Perceived Loss Potential. The maturity of judgment perspective suggests 
that adolescents, as opposed to adults, may underestimate the consequences of
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antisocial decisions based on their shortened future-time perspective. Research 
does suggest that adolescents underestimate the risk of experimenting with risky 
health behaviors (Cohn et al., 1995). In addition, there is research to suggest 
that adolescents who engage in risky actions are likely to engender a diminished 
perception of risk. For example, risk-taking adolescents rate their behaviors as 
less risky and more controllable and risk-taking consequences as being less 
serious than non-risk takers (Benthin, Slovic, & Severson, 1993).
Further, it may be the case that adolescents continue to underestimate 
base-rates of risk-taking consequences even as they increase their participation in 
risky behavior. For example, research suggests that adolescents who participate 
in risky behaviors are overly optimistic about the size of and their chances for 
controlling risk (Benthin et al. 1993), with increased risk taking being associated 
with decreased risk perception (Maggs et al., 1995; Siegel & Cousins, 1994). In 
addition, longitudinal work based on college students found no relation between 
perceived risk (certainty of arrest) and criminal behavior. Instead, this work found 
that past criminal behavior lead to a diminished perception of risk (Paternoster, 
Saltzman, Waldo, & Chiricos, 1983). The latter finding was also replicated in a 
sixth month longitudinal study of high school students (Paternoster et al.).
Along similar lines, delinquent adolescents, in particular, may have a higher 
tolerance for negative consequences that are associated with antisocial decisions. 
Thus, based on past experience and peer norms, these individuals may have a 
higher threshold for negative consequences before deciding against an action. For 
instance, research has found that high-risk taking adolescents are less likely to
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underestimate risk than low-risk taking adolescents (Cohn et al., 1995). None the 
less, further research is needed to understand the role of loss potential in 
adolescent antisocial decisions, particularly in comparison to adults.
Findings from social information-processing research also support the 
notion of a relation between the perception of diminished negative consequences, 
heightened threshold for negative consequences, and antisocial behavior. For 
example, on step five of the SIP model, aggressive individuals endorse fewer 
negative outcome expectancies in association with aggressive acts than non- 
aggressive individuals (e.g. Boldizar et al., 1989; Slaby & Guerra, 1988). Further, 
Guerra (1989) found that high-level delinquent adolescents believe consequences 
of cheating are less severe and less important than low-level delinquent 
adolescents. Finally, research shows that aggressive versus non-aggressive 
adolescent boys indicate they would have a happy affect even in normally fearful 
and sad situations (Lochman & Dodge, 1994). Thus, it may be that adolescent 
antisocial decisions are associated with both diminished negative outcome 
expectancies and increased thresholds for negative consequences. Flowever, 
further research is needed to demarcate this decision process in both adolescents 
and adults.
Reward Structures. The maturity of judgment perspective posits that 
adolescents may perceive different benefits in antisocial decision making than 
adults, including increased excitement and peer approval, and diminished costs, 
based on a decreased future-time perspective. This view parallels the 
hypothesis that adolescent and adult reward structures may differ, such that
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adolescent judgment may be biased towards a reward orientation. The biased 
reward structure hypothesis is supported by recent fMRI research (Bjork et al., 
2004) suggesting that within adolescents, the anticipatory reward system is less 
neurologically sensitive than that of adults’. At the same time, research on 
adolescent risk taking heavily implicates a positive reward orientation, as well.
For instance, Bauman’s (1980) innovative work found that the most salient (high 
probability and high importance) positive consequences for adolescent risk 
takers were those most likely to bring direct and immediate satisfaction.
However, past research has primarily focused on risky (e.g. smoking cigarettes), 
as opposed to delinquent (e.g. shoplifting) behavior. Because the latter includes 
legal as well as psychosocial consequences, it is unclear whether adolescents 
would demonstrate a biased reward orientation in illegal contexts.
In addition, research couched within the SIP framework supports the 
notion of a biased reward structure in aggressive youth. This work shows that 
within step five of the SIP model, outcome expectancies are biased in favor of 
hostile outcomes in aggressive individuals (e.g. & Guerra, 1989). However, 
research on biased outcome expectancies has not been extended to non- 
aggressive antisocial decisions (e.g. shoplifting). Further, SIP research on 
biased outcome expectancies has not yet compared adolescent versus adult 
decision making. Both of these research directions would be fruitful next steps.
Depth of Processing. A majority of decision theories endorse a thorough 
analysis of future-oriented consequences in mature decision-makers (e.g. Janis 
& Mann, 1977). In addition, social information-processing theory provides limited
25
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support for the hypothesis that positive social adjustment is associated with 
increased depth of processing (Crick & Dodge, 1994). However, dual process 
cognitive theory presents contrary evidence, suggesting that adults may utilize 
more automatic decision strategies than adolescents.
The maturity of judgment perspective associates a less reasoned decision 
process with adolescents versus adults, a view point that is in-line with the 
hypothesis that adolescents engage in a less thorough decision analysis than 
adults. However, developmental risk taking research offers little insight into 
depth of processing in adolescents. For the most part, this work has coded for 
qualitative risk content, as opposed to quantitative processing depth. However, 
research does show that in terms of adolescents’ risky behavior, adolescents 
mention fewer consequences, in total, than their parents (Beyth-Marom et al., 
1993). Yet in order to better understand adolescent antisocial decision making, 
future decision research would benefit from the inclusion of depth of processing 
variables in studies including both adolescents and adults.
Similarly, little social information-processing research has assessed 
processing depth in relation to aggression. A single study did find that non- 
aggressive adolescents generate more outcome expectancies (step five) than 
high-level or low-level aggressive adolescents (Slaby & Guerra, 1988). Further, 
this line of research shows that adolescent offenders who receive decision 
training are able to generate more consequences to hypothetical aggressive 
events than those who do not receive training (Guerra & Slaby, 1990). However,
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future research would benefit from further comparisons of depth of processing in 
delinquent versus non-delinquent youth.
Contrary to SIP, dual process cognitive theory (Klaczynski, 2004) asserts 
that decision making is governed primarily by a heuristic, experiential system, 
which can be consciously superceded by a rational, analytic system, a skill that 
likely increases with age (Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002). Further, adults may be 
inclined towards automatic processing based on their increased experience, 
because the experiential system is situation dependent, with cues from specific 
circumstances activating heuristics (Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002). Similarly, fMRI 
research suggests that adult decisions regarding risky behavior are relatively 
automatic, and that adolescents are more likely to weigh the consequences of 
risky behavior than adults (Baird, 2004). Although previous research has not 
measured consequence generation in relation to delinquent decisions (e.g. 
cheating, stealing), increased experience with antisocial events may predict a 
more shallow depth of processing. None the less, additional research is required 
to disentangle the relation between age and event experience in relation to 
processing depth.
Response Solutions. The maturity of judgment perspective suggests that 
with age, individuals should have access to improved response solutions. 
Specifically, response solutions should be less affected by psychosocial factors 
such as peer influence and short-term concerns. Similarly, both risk taking 
(Fischhoff, 1992) and social information-processing (Dodge & Price, 1994; 
Feldman & Dodge, 1987, Mayeux & Cillessen, 2003) research posit that with
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increased age, individuals should improve in their identification of alternative 
courses of action. This idea is supported in a review of the adolescent decision 
making literature by Mann et al. (1989). Although empirical work on risk taking 
provides tangential support for this hypothesis, little work has explicitly 
investigated adolescents’ deliberation of options in delinquent contexts (Furby & 
Beyth-Marom, 1992).
Past research suggests that high-risk, as opposed to low-risk, adolescents 
consider fewer response options in antisocial contexts. For instance, research 
has found that risk-inclined adolescents rate risky activities as less avoidable 
than their peers (Benthin et al. 1993). Further, in a risk-taking diary study of 
female college students, responses were characterized as largely having failed to 
consider alternatives (Shapiro, Siegel, Scovill, & Hays, 1998). Finally, research 
based on college students shows that on decision making vignettes, engagement 
in behaviors is associated with certainty of the decision (Rolison & Scherman,
2003). In this case, certainty may be indicative of lack of consideration of 
alternatives. However, further research is required to explicate age and 
delinquency group differences in consideration of response solutions.
Social information-processing theory also provides evidence of a relation 
between generation of alternate solutions (step four) and aggression. For 
example, aggressive youth generate fewer non-aggressive solutions to social 
problems than non-aggressive youth (Rabiner, Lenhart, & Lochman, 1990; Slaby 
& Guerra, 1988). In addition, aggressive youth generate solutions that are more 
aggressive and less pro-social than non-aggressive youth (Quiggle et al., 1992).
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Similarly, for responses beyond their first choice solution, aggressive children 
generate less effective resolutions than non-aggressive children (Richard & 
Dodge, 1982). At the same time, more recent work shows that delinquent 
adolescents generate less effective first choice and second choice solutions than 
do non-delinquent youth. Yet when delinquent youth are trained in decision 
making, they show improved effectiveness in their second choice solutions, in 
comparison to control groups. Thus, future SIP research would benefit from 
continued investigation of response solutions in adults, adolescents, and 
delinquent youth. In particular, this research should examine both quantity and 
quality of generated solutions.
Summary and Conclusion 
Adolescents clearly have an increased propensity towards criminal 
behavior (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983), yet there is an absence of research on 
adolescent criminal decision making (Scott & Grisso, 1997). This vital domain of 
decision making research has been neglected by researchers, although 
legislative policy in this area holds some of the most serious consequences for 
adolescents. Such a dearth of research forces law makers and theorists to rely 
on a broad spectrum of decision making research in an attempt to understand 
adolescent culpability (Scott & Grisso, 1997).
The lack of research on adolescent criminal decision processes is all the 
more surprising, based on the numerous criminological theories that indicate an 
association between the decision process and antisocial choices (e.g. Cornish & 
Clarke, 1986; Crick & Dodge, 1994; Gibbs, 1975; see Guerra, 1989). Work that
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investigates adolescent decision processes in antisocial contexts beyond 
aggression would inform not only legal policy, but also relevant criminological 
literature. While social information-processing theory has much to offer 
criminological research, little work has focused on the developmental stage of 
adolescence, although this time period parallels a heightened incidence of 
antisocial behavior. In addition, only a minority of SIP research has measured 
open-ended responses to outcome expectancies (e.g. Guerra, 1989). Instead, 
studies often present participants with lists of potential consequences of 
decisions, likely a measure of more deliberate decision processes. Further, SIP 
research has yet to extend its focus to other antisocial contexts, such as cheating 
and stealing (Fontaine, in press). Finally, SIP research has yet to incorporate 
immature judgment theory to examine and explain differences in decision 
processes and outcomes (e.g. Jacobs-Quadrel et al., 1993).
This review has outlined a framework for future research that draws 
together cognitive, criminological, developmental, social, and physiological 
literatures. Based on the notion of criminal responsibility, future psychological 
research should focus on understanding the differential antisocial decision 
processes of adolescents and adults. Utilizing the social information-processing 
framework, this review focuses on steps four through six: response access, 
response decision, and response enactment. Within these three steps, this 
review suggests that five dimensions of consequential thinking: perceived 
incentives, perceived loss potential, reward structures, depth of processing, and
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generation of response solutions are likely affected by immature judgment, 
influencing adolescent decision processes.
This review argues that consequential thinking likely mediates the relation 
between immature judgment and delinquent behavior based on several 
premises. First, past research has shown that social information-processing 
variables may act as mediators in predicting antisocial behavior (e.g. Burks,
Laird, Dodge, Petit, & Bates, 1999; Dodge et al., 2003; Schultz, 2003). In 
addition, immature judgment, as a distal factor, should contribute to the 
organization of information-processing patterns, which might be considered more 
proximal factors. Finally, a mediator should elucidate how external factors (such 
as psycho-social influences) undertake internal meaning (e.g. information 
processing) (Baron & Kenny, 1986).
Research Aims
The first aim of the research is to compare low risk adolescents (high 
school students) and adults within the social information-processing framework. 
First, the two groups will be compared on standardized measures of maturity of 
judgment, as well as the maturity of judgment content of their outcome 
expectancies. In addition, low risk adolescents and adults will be evaluated for 
differences on the five afore-mentioned aspects of consequential thinking. These 
comparisons will not include high risk adolescents, as detained delinquents are 
expected to differ from adults in a variety of ways (age, IQ, delinquency) that go 
beyond the scope of this research.
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The second aim is to compare low risk (high school students) and high 
risk (detained delinquents) adolescents within the social information-processing 
framework. With few exceptions, decision making research has investigated 
individuals who are unlikely to come before the courts wherein their culpability 
might be in question. Instead, middle class Caucasian adolescents are the norm 
for most research (Mulvey & Peeples, 1996). First, low versus high risk 
adolescents will be evaluated in terms of standardized measures of maturity of 
judgment and the maturity of judgment content of their outcome expectancies. 
Next, low and high risk groups will be compared on the five afore-mentioned 
aspects of consequential thinking.
The third aim of the research is to understand how adolescents and adults 
may differ in terms of variable associations. First, the study aims to gauge which 
theoretical variable is most predictive of delinquency for adolescents and for 
adults. Second, this study aims to test a model in which consequential thinking 
mediates the relation between immature judgment outcome expectancies and 
delinquency in adolescents and in adults. Third, this study will test a series of 
interactions between theoretically important independent variables and 
adolescence, to determine which variables uniquely affect adolescents as 
opposed to adults in predicting delinquency.
It is expected that male and female participants will differ in their decision 
making. For example, as found in previous work (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; 
Modecki, in press) female participants are hypothesized to show more mature 
judgment (decreased peer influence, increased risk perception, lengthier future-
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time perspective) than male participants. Further, this research posits that 
female participants will display increased social information-processing skills on 
the five consequential thinking factors, a hypothesis that is also in-line with 
previous work (see Crick & Dodge, 1994, for a review). However, it is expected 
that the pattern of relations between variables will be identical for male and 
female participants. Consequently, gender will be included as a covariate in all 
analyses, but explicit differences in decision processes are not expected to vary 
by gender.
Hypotheses
Aim 1: Comparing Low Risk Adolescents vs. Adults.
(1) Maturity of judgment components
Modecki (in press), found that adolescents versus adults differed on the 
maturity of judgment aspects of responsibility, temperance, and perspective. 
Accordingly, adolescents are expected to show decreased risk perception, 
future-orientation and resistance to peer influence and increased sensation 
seeking on standardized measures, in comparison to adults.
In addition, adolescents are expected to spontaneously mention more 
outcome expectancies associated with immature judgment (peer influence TO, 
sensation seeking TO, negative emotion TO, risk perception TO, short term 
consequence TO engage in behavior) and fewer outcome expectancies 
associated with mature judgment (risk perception NOT TO, legal consequences 
NOT TO, long term consequences NOT TO engage in behavior) than adults.
(2) Five factors of consequential thinking
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A) Adolescents will perceive greater benefits in delinquent and aggressive 
behaviors as compared to adults. Consequently, adolescents will spontaneously 
mentioning more positive outcome expectancies than adults. In addition, 
adolescents will be more likely to engage in antisocial acts which they believe are 
wrong, and anticipate greater peer antisocial behavior than adults
B) Adolescents will underestimate negative consequences (outcome 
expectancies) associated with delinquent and aggressive behaviors, as 
compared to adults, measured three different ways. First, adolescents will 
spontaneously mention fewer negative outcome expectancies than adults. 
Second, on likert scale ratings measuring the likelihood of negative 
consequences (being caught, detained, spending time in a delinquent facility), 
adolescents will underestimate the likelihood of negative consequences as 
compared to adults. Third, adolescents will care less about getting caught than 
adults.
C) Based on Bauman (1980), adolescents will display a positive reward 
bias. Thus, adolescents will spontaneously mention a higher positive to negative 
outcome expectancy ratio regarding delinquent and aggressive behaviors than 
adults. Adolescents will attach greater importance to positive, as opposed to 
negative, outcome expectancies than adults. Finally, adolescents will respond 
that they require a less positive feeling about engaging in an antisocial act and 
have a higher threshold for risk than adults.
D) Based on recent fMRI research (Baird, 2004), adolescents versus 
adults will display a shallower depth of processing. Accordingly, adolescents will
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spontaneously mention fewer outcome expectancies, total (both positive and 
negative), than adults. In addition, adolescents will report less past event 
experience than adults.
E) Based on Halpern-Felsher and Cauffman (2001), adolescents will 
generate fewer response solutions to delinquent and aggressive scenarios than 
adults. Hence, adolescents will generate fewer non delinquent//aggressive 
response solutions to decision scenarios.
Aim 2: Comparing Low vs. High Risk Adolescents.
(1) Maturity of judgment components
Based on Modecki (in press), wherein low and high delinquency 
adolescents differed on the maturity of judgment aspects of temperance and 
perspective. Accordingly, low delinquency adolescents are expected to show 
increased risk perception, future-orientation and resistance to peer influence and 
decreased sensation seeking on standardized measures, in comparison to high 
delinquency adolescents.
In addition, low delinquency adolescents are expected to spontaneously 
mention fewer outcome expectancies associated with immature judgment (peer 
influence TO, sensation seeking TO, negative emotion TO, risk perception TO, 
and short term consequence TO engage in behavior) and more outcome 
expectancies associated with mature judgment (risk perception NOT TO, legal 
consequences NOT TO, and long term consequences NOT TO engage in 
behavior) than high delinquency adolescents.
(2) Five factors of consequential thinking
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A) As found in Slaby and Guerra (1988), low risk versus high risk 
adolescents will perceive fewer benefits in delinquent and aggressive behavior. 
Therefore, low risk adolescents will spontaneously mention fewer positive 
outcome expectancies than high risk adolescents.
B) As suggested by previous research (e.g. Jacobs-Quadrel et al., 1993), 
low risk adolescents will be less likely to underestimate negative consequences 
(outcome expectancies) associated with delinquent and aggressive behaviors 
than high risk adolescents, as measured two different ways. First, low risk 
adolescents will spontaneously mention more negative outcome expectancies 
than high risk adolescents. Second, on likert scale ratings measuring the 
likelihood of presented negative consequences (being caught, detained, 
spending time in a delinquent facility), low risk adolescents will estimate negative 
consequences as more likely as compared to high risk adolescents.
C) Based on Bauman (1980), low risk adolescents will be less likely than 
high risk adolescents to display a positive reward bias. Thus, low risk 
adolescents will spontaneously mentioning a lower positive to negative outcome 
expectancy ratio regarding delinquent and aggressive behaviors than high risk 
adolescents.
D) Because past event experience may activate a heuristic decision 
process in high risk adolescents, low risk adolescents will display greater depth 
of processing in delinquent and aggressive decision scenarios than high risk 
adolescents. Consequently, low risk adolescents will spontaneously mention
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more positive and negative outcome expectancies, total, than high risk 
adolescents.
E) Although high risk adolescents may have more experience with 
delinquent and aggressive events than low risk adolescents, their current 
situation does not suggest that they generate effective alternative solutions to 
these circumstances. Hence, low risk adolescents will generate more non- 
delinquent/aggressive response solutions to decision scenarios than high risk 
adolescents.
Aim 3: Adolescent and Adult Differences in Variable Associations.
A) For adolescents, a composite of maturity of judgment scales should be 
most predictive of delinquency, followed by consequential thinking composites. 
For adolescents, maturity of judgment outcome expectancies should be mediated 
by consequential thinking, and thus not be predictive in the overall equation.
Whereas for adults, only the consequential thinking factor composites 
should be predictive of delinquency. Maturity of judgment may not predict 
delinquency in adults, as judgment may have little effect for older individuals.
B) Because adolescents are likely to display a high degree of immature 
judgment content in their outcome expectancies, which in turn likely affects 
consequential thinking, consequential thinking will mediate the association 
between immature judgment outcome expectancies and delinquency.
For adults, immature judgment outcome expectancies likely do not affect 
delinquency, and thus no such mediation is predicted to occur.
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C) Several theoretically important independent variables are predicted to 
uniquely affect adolescents as compared to adults. These variables will be 
selected upon completion of aims 1 and 2.
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The current study consisted of three samples: adolescent, adult, and 
delinquent individuals. The samples differed in their population characteristics: 
the adolescent sample was drawn from a high school, the adult sample were 
parents of students drawn from undergraduate psychology laboratory 
experiments, and the delinquent youth were drawn from a state juvenile 
delinquent facility. Thus, the groups may have differed in terms of IQ. In order to 
minimize such differences between groups, verbal ability was controlled for in the 
analyses between high school students and delinquent youth and for 
comparative analyses between high school students and adults, SES and 
average high school grades were controlled.
The adolescent sample (ages 12-18) consisted of 134 male (M age= 15.66; 
S D  = 1.37) and 132 female (M age= 15.56; S D  = 1.39) students enrolled in an 
urban public high school. As seen in Table 1, socioeconomic status (SES), as 
measured by parents’ education level, was high school or less (43.8% mothers, 
45.6% fathers), college degree or some college (42.8% mothers, 35.2% fathers), 
and graduate school (13.4% mothers, 19.2% fathers). The adolescent 
participants were freshman (39.4%), sophomores (24.2%), juniors (8.9%), and
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seniors (27.5%). Grades for the last full year completed in high school (average 
grade) was all A ’s (14.2%), A ’s and B’s (39.9%), all B’s (4.1%), B’s and C’s 
(24.0%), all C’s (2.2%), C’s and D’s (10.4%), all D’s (1.5%), D’s and F’s (3%), 
and all F’s (.7%).
The high school was selected based on its socioeconomic diversity and its 
status as a major school district associated with the delinquent facility. All 
students present in selected classes on the day of the survey participated in the 
study. Classes were chosen to incorporate students with a wide-range of 
academic abilities.
The adult sample (ages 35-63) consisted of 111 male (M age =  50.77; S D  =  
4.87) and 150 female (M age = 47.98; S D  = 45.1) participants. Education level for 
the adult participants was less than high school (1.2%), high school (13.7%) 
some college (35.1%), college degree (27.5%) and some graduate school 
(22.5%).
Finally, the delinquent sample (ages 14-17) consisted of 45 male (M age = 
15.87; SD = .76) and 16 female (M age =  15.63; SD = .89) delinquent youth 
detained in the state delinquency facility. SES, as measured by parents 
education level, was high school or less (70.5% mothers, 90.2% fathers), college 
degree or some college (21.3% mothers, 8.2% fathers), and graduate school 
(8.2% mothers, 1.6% fathers). The delinquent participants’ education level was 
junior high school (40%), freshman (13.3%), sophomore (31.7%), and junior 
(15%).
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As seen in Table 1, the subjects’ race was primarily Caucasian, a lack of 
racial diversity that is consistent with the demographics of the New England state 
from which the data were collected. Also seen in Table 1, for the adult and 
adolescent samples, multivariate analysis of variance found significant 
differences in socio-economic status proxy and average high school grade 
among groups. Thus these variables were controlled in subsequent analyses.
For the second set of analyses, comparing adolescent and delinquent groups, a 
multivariate analysis of variance found significant differences in gender, IQ, 
socio-economic status proxy, and average high school grade among groups.
(See Table 1.) Thus, these variables were controlled within this set of analyses.
Materials
Participants received a questionnaire consisting of demographics, 
including brief IQ, decision making vignettes including outcome expectancies and 
standardized risk perception scales, standardized psychosocial measures 
(immature judgment factors), and a standardized delinquency measure (see 
Appendix A).
Demographics
Demographic questions included age, gender, parent or own and spouse 
education level as a proxy for socio-economic status, and measures of past 
justice system experience. A verbal IQ measure (Wechsler, 1991) was also 
included for adolescents and delinquents. For both groups, the verbal IQ 
measure was read aloud. For the adolescent sample, the verbal IQ measure 
was read aloud to an entire class of participants, who were asked to write their
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best definition of each word on the space provided on their survey. For the 
delinquent sample, research assistants individually administered the verbal IQ 
measure, reading the measure aloud and recorded the participant’s verbal 
response. The IQ measures were scored by the researcher, after an initial 
training with an upper-level undergraduate Psychology student to assess 
reliability.
Decision Vignettes
The vignette format was based on the Youth Decision Making 
Questionnaire (YDMQ) (Ford, Wentzel, Wood, Stevens, & Siesfeld, 1990) and 
adapted to measure different factors of delinquency and aggression. Based on 
the YDMQ, the delinquency scenarios included cheating on a test and shoplifting. 
An aggression vignette was adapted from O’Conner, Archer, and Wu (1992), and 
depicted a movie theatre disruption. Finally, participants were asked to describe 
an antisocial decision they had to make in the last three months and “Write about 
what (they) decided to do and why.” The five dimensions of consequential 
thinking: reward structures, perceived incentives, perceived loss potential, depth 
of processing, and generation of response solutions were measured based on 
open-ended responses to vignettes. Further, responses were coding for 
(im)mature judgment content: peer influence, sensation seeking, negative 
emotion, risk perception, legal, short term, and long term consequences as 
reason TO/NOT TO engage in antisocial act.
The coding procedure was created based on an amalgamation of past 
decision research (Cauffman, 1996, Guerra, 1989, Lewis, 1981). (See Appendix
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B for coding guidelines.) To train, the principle investigator and four research 
assistants coded a subset of surveys (n = 60). (See Appendix C for coding 
sheet.) The principle investigator discussed each evaluation with the research 
assistants to establish reliability. Once inter-rater reliability was established, two 
separate groups, comprised of two research assistants each, coded responses. 
Within each group, the two research assistants agreed on the coding for each 
response. For each sample, 10% of the surveys were cross-coded for inter­
group reliability (adults n = 30, adolescents n = 30, delinquents, n = 20). Raters 
agreed on 94.5% of their initial coding decisions (kappa = .66).
Kappas and percent agreement were: peer influence TO (% agreement = 
87%, kappa = .61), sensation seeking TO (% agreement = 100%, kappa = .97), 
negative emotion TO (% agreement = 94%, kappa = .57), risk perception TO (% 
agreement = 94%, kappa = .22), short term consequences TO (% agreement = 
85%, kappa = .49), and long term consequences TO (% agreement = 99.57%, 
kappa = .67) engage in antisocial behavior. Kappa and percent agreement 
were: peer influence NOT TO (% agreement = 99.57%, kappa = .67), sensation 
seeking NOT TO (% agreement = 100%, kappa =1),  negative emotion NOT TO 
(% agreement = 97%, kappa = .80), risk perception NOT TO (% agreement = 
93%, kappa = .79), legal consequences NOT TO (% agreement = 97%, kappa = 
.92), short term consequences NOT TO (% agreement = 91%, kappa = .50), and 
long term consequences NOT TO (% agreement = 95%, kappa = .66) engage in 
antisocial behavior. In cases of disagreement, the principle investigator decided 
on the best-fitting response code.
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Perceived Incentives. A perceived incentives score was based on the 
summed score of the number of positive outcome expectancies (endorsing 
antisocial decisions) generated by respondents.
Because adolescents were hypothesized to act based on perceived peer 
behavior, two additional items designed to measure peer influence were included 
in the survey. First, a measure of peer influence was created through the 
inclusion of a set of decision questions that paralleled those on the decision 
vignettes, with the exception that the former were based within an individual, as 
opposed to a peer context, based on Berndt (1979). Three decision questions 
asked, for example, “How wrong is it to take clothing from a store without paying 
for it?” Responses were measured on a four-point scale, from 1 “Not at all” to 4 
“Very wrong.” A high score indicates high moral opposition to the behavior. For 
this sample, Cronbach’s a = .59, M =  3.08, S D  = .65, Range = 1 -4 .  The Berndt 
scale was utilized to create an Operationalized Peer Influence (OPI) score. The 
OPI was created by reverse coding the Berndt scale, and subtracting the reverse 
coded Berndt score from the decision score for each parallel vignette. The 
absolute value of the mean of all the “decision score minus wrong score” is the 
final OPI score. For this sample, Cronbach’s a = .70, M -  .34, S D  = .37, Range = 
0 -  2.67. A high score on the OPI indicates high operationalized peer influence.
Second, an item was attached to each scenario asking “How likely do you 
think your friends would be to (shoplift)?” in an attempt to gauge perceived peer 
norms. The Anticipated Peer Behavior (APB) items were measured on a five- 
point scale, from 1 “Very unlikely” to 5 “Very likely.” A high score on the APB
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indicates high anticipated peer antisocial behavior. For this sample, Cronbach’s 
a = .65, M  = 2.41, S D  = .74, Range = 1 - 4 .
Perceived Loss Potential. Perceived loss potential was based on three 
indices. First, a score was summed for the number of negative outcome 
expectancies generated. Second, perceived negative consequences were 
measured by adapting criminal sanctions questions from Fried and Reppucci 
(2001). The criminal sanctions scale included three five-point likert scale items 
measuring chances of getting caught by police, found guilty of a crime, and 
spending time in detention. These items were measured from 1 “Very unlikely” to 
5 “Very likely.” For this sample, Cronbach’s a = .73, M  = 2.99, S D  = .67, Range 
= 1 -5 .  A higher score on the criminal sanctions scale suggests perceptions of 
strong negative consequences. Finally, each vignette included an item asking 
“How much would you care if you were caught?” These items were measured 
from 1 “Not at all” to 4 “Very much.” For this sample, Cronbach’s a = .70, M  = 
3.39, SD = .73, Range = 1 - 4 .  A higher score on the Care Scale indicates high 
amounts of caring about getting caught.
Reward Structures. Reward structures were measured with questions 
asking participants to list the positive and negative outcome expectancies 
(counterbalanced) they would think about in considering each scenario. 
Participants were asked to circle the consequence most important to their 
decision.
Two measures of reward structure were created: First, a benefit/cost ratio 
was created based on Fried and Reppucci (2001), in which the total number of
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positive outcome expectancies was divided by the total number of negative 
outcome expectancies. Second, participants received a score for the most 
important outcome expectancy considered: 1 for a positive outcome expectancy 
and zero for a negative outcome expectancy.
Further, to assess the possibility that adolescents in general, and 
delinquents in particular, have a higher tolerance for negative outcome 
expectancies and a lower threshold for positive outcome expectancies when 
engaging in antisocial behavior, negative and positive probability scales were 
included in vignette form. Participants were asked to mark with an X along the 
provided scale spectrums, and ruler measurements were taken of each marked 
spot. The first scale (positive) asked “How good would you have to feel about 
(stealing clothes) before you would decide to (steal)?” The positive scale ranged 
from 1 “You would have to feel very bad about doing this” to 5 “You would have 
to feel really good about doing this,” and was transferred to a 100 point scale 
when the ruler measurement was taken. The second scale ranged from 0% to 
100% and asked (negative) “How likely would it have to be that you’d get caught 
for you to decide NOT to (steal the clothes)?." A low score on the former scale 
indicates a high discomfort threshold, while a high score on the later scale 
indicates a high risk threshold. For this sample, the positive threshold measure 
had a Cronbach’s a of .75, M  = 63.28, S D  =  28.83, Range = 0 - 1 0 0 ,  and the 
negative threshold measure had a Cronbach’s a of .72, M  = 38.07, S D  = 27.68, 
Range = 0 -100 .
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Depth of Processing and Past Event Experience. Depth of processing 
was assessed by summing the total number of positive and negative outcome 
expectancies generated for each vignette. In addition, depth of processing is 
hypothesized to be associated with past event experience. Thus, past event 
experience was assessed utilizing an item developed by Weinstein (1987), 
asking “About how much experience do you have with this type of decision?” 
Participant responses were measured on a five-item scale from (a) “I don’t know 
anyone this has happened to” to (e) “Has happened to me more than once.” For 
this sample, Cronbach’s a = .51, M =  3.24, S D  =  1.09, Range = 1 - 5 .  A higher 
score on past event experience indicates more experience with an event.
Generation of Response Solutions. Finally, following each vignette, 
participants were asked to generate alternate solutions to each antisocial 
decision. Generation of solutions to a decision was gauged by summing the 
number o f solutions offered in response to each vignette, as well as summing the 
number of non-delinquent/aggressive solutions generated.
Coded Immature Judgment Factors. As seen in Appendix B, negative and 
positive outcome expectancies were also coded for immaturity of judgment 
content. Categories were mutually exclusive, with the exception that 
expectancies marked as risk perception could also fall under long or short term 
consequences, as well as legal consequences.
All expectancies were coded only when the emotion, risk, or 
consequences directly pertained to the participant. In addition, peer influence 
was coded only when a friend or peer was specifically mentioned and not more
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general “people.” Further, risk perception was coded only when a specific risk 
was mentioned (e.g. “getting caught” or “might get hurt” not “negative 
consequences”). Finally, short term consequence was coded only for a 
consequence that would immediately and directly ensue from the antisocial 
decision in question.
Immature Judgment Factors
Four standardized psychosocial measures were also utilized: Future 
Outlook Inventory (Cauffman & Woolard, 1999), Risk Perception Scale (Siegel et 
al., 1994), Sensation Seeking (Arnett, 1994), and Resistance to Peer Influence 
(Steinberg, 2002). An addition measure of peer influence was created through 
the inclusion of two sets of parallel decision questions, one set based within a 
peer context, and another set based within an individual context, based on 
Berndt (1979). The vignettes also included a measure of peer norms.
The Future Outlook Inventory (FIO) (Cauffman & Woolard, 1999) is a 14 
item scale based on previously published scales, including the Life Orientation 
Task (Scheier & Carver, 1985) the Zimbardo Time Perspective Scale (Zimbardo, 
1990), and the Consideration of Future Consequences Scale (Strathman, 
Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994). The FOI is a measure of consideration of 
future events and consequences, and is rated on a 4-point Likert scale from 
“Never True” to “Always True.” An example item from this scale is “I think about 
how things might be in the future.” For this sample Cronbach’s a  =  .77, M  = 2.62, 
S D  = .41, Range = 1 - 3.71. A high score on the FOI indicates extended future 
outlook.
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Two measures associated with risk perception were employed, the Risk 
Perception Scale (Siegel et al., 1994) and the Arnett Inventory of Sensation 
Seeking (AISS) (Arnett, 1994). The Risk Perception Scale (RPS) is a measure 
that taps perceived risk of eighteen different risky behaviors, for example, 
“smoking marijuana” and “having sex without a condom.” The RPS is scored on 
a nine-point Likert scale from 0 “Not at all risky” to 8 “Extremely risky.” For this 
sample, Cronbach’s a = 91, M =  5.26, SD = 1.27, Range = .11 - 8. A high score 
on this subscale indicates high perceived risk. The second measure associated 
with risk perception is the Arnett Inventory of Sensation Seeking (AISS) (Arnett, 
1994). This is an 18 item scale measured on a 4-point likert scale from 1 “Does 
not describe me at all” to 4 “Describes me very well.” For this sample, 
Cronbach’s a = .72, M  = 2.52, SD = .41, Range = 1.45 - 3.78. An example 
statement is “I can see how it would be interesting to marry someone from a 
foreign country.” Higher scores on this measure indicate high sensation seeking.
A standardized measure tapped resistance to peer influence, a revised 
Resistance to Peer Influence Scale (Steinberg, 2002). This scale gauges 
independence from peer pressure and consists often items. Based on poor 
reliability in a pilot test, the scale was altered from its original format. Wherein 
each question originally included two contradictory statements, the format was 
revised to include only a single sentence, such as “Some people go along with 
their friends just to keep their friends happy.” Ten items are measured on a four- 
point scale from 1 “Very much like me” to 4 “Not at all like me”. For this sample,
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Cronbach’s a = .71, M =  3.17, S D  = .47, Range = 1.30 - 4. A high score on the 
RPS indicates a high resistance to peer influence.
Outcomes
Outcomes measures included antisocial decision making and delinquency. 
Antisocial decision making was assessed with an item associated with each 
vignette asking what participants would decide to do in each scenario. For 
example, “Would you shoplift or would you refuse to take the item?” Responses 
are measured on a four point scale from 1 “Definitely refuse” to 4 “Definitely 
shoplift.” For this sample, Cronbach’s a = .68, M =  1.97, S D  = .70, Range =1 -4 .  
High scores indicate high levels of antisocial decision making.
Delinquency was measured with Elliot and Ageton’s (1985) self-report 
delinquency scale. This scale asks “How many times in the last year have you 
(been involved in gang fights),” consists of 45 items, and measures delinquent 
and aggressive behavior and substance use. Five items from the original scale 
which assessed status behaviors were dropped in the current study. Further, 
because individuals were inconsistent in their numerical estimates of behavioral 
engagement, utilizing words such as “many,” “a lot,” and “infinity,” all items 
marked above zero were recoded to “1.” This method has been recognized as a 
successful summative method for scoring multiple-item measures of antisocial 
behavior, as it limits the contributions of more minor behaviors and does not 
require an assignment of metric values to response categories (Osgood, 
McMorris, & Potenza, 2002). A total delinquency score measuring whether an 
individual engaged in the 40 behaviors was then calculated, based on the mean
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of all items multiplied by 100. For this sample, Cronbach’s alpha = a = .92, M  =  
13.90, S D  =  18.15, Range = 0 - 1 0 0 .  A high score on this scale indicates 
participation in a large variety of delinquent behavior.
Procedure
Appropriate IRB approval was obtained through the University. This 
approval allowed for passive consent from parents of adolescent and delinquent 
participants.
For adolescents, permission was obtained from an urban high school to 
survey students in a classes selected to include students on both lower and 
higher-level academic tracks. Passive parental consent was obtained from the 
youths’ parents and informed assent was obtained from the adolescents. 
Students were told that their participation and responses would not affect their 
academic status, and were given a debriefing form upon completion of the 
survey.
A sample of adults was obtained by offering undergraduate students class 
credit for their parent’s participation in the survey. Students addressed packets 
to their parents, including an assent letter explaining the study and a debriefing 
form. Parents returned their completed survey to the researcher in a pre­
addressed, pre-stamped enveloped.
The delinquent facility had custody of the program youth; thus parental 
consent was not required. Nonetheless, passive consent was obtained from the 
youths’ parents. Informed assent was also obtained from the adolescents, with 
an emphasis that participation and responses would not affect legal status. The
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measures were administered orally on an individual basis, and participants 
responded orally, with the researchers transcribing their answers. Youth were 
given a debriefing form upon completion of the survey.
Analysis Plan
The analyses were first conducted utilizing data from adolescent and adult 
samples. These analyses focused on age group and gender differences in 
maturity of judgment, followed by age group and gender differences on the five 
factors of consequential thinking.
The second segment of analyses focused on data from adolescent and 
delinquent youth samples. The adult sample was not included in these analyses 
as the groups were expected to differ from delinquents in a variety of ways (both 
age and delinquency) which were beyond the scope of this research. This set of 
analyses focused on delinquency-group (adolescent or delinquent) and gender 
differences in maturity of judgment, followed by delinquency-group (adolescent or 
delinquent) and gender differences on the five factors of consequential thinking. 
This second set of analyses was also run based on cut-score delinquency group, 
such that all adolescents, whether incarcerated or not, were categorized as low 
or high levels of delinquent behavior. This method of grouping allowed for the 
investigation of group differences beyond the confound of being caught and 
prosecuted.
Finally, the last segment of analyses assessed adolescent and adult 
differences in variable associations. Delinquent youth were not included in this 
segment of analyses. The first set of analyses tested the most predictive
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theoretical variable on total delinquency above and beyond demographic 
variables correlated with delinquency. The second set of analyses tested a 
model, for adolescents and for adults, in which consequential thinking mediated 
the relation between immature judgment outcome expectancies and total 
delinquency. Because past research found a relation between immature 
judgment and delinquency (Modecki, in press), the main purpose of the 
mediational analyses was to understand why this association may exist (Frazier, 
Tix, & Barron, 2004). The third set of analyses explored theoretically significant 
independent variable by adolescent interactions. The purpose of the moderation 
analyses was to address for whom (adolescents or adults) consequential thinking 
variables were more strongly related to delinquency (Frazier et al., 2004). Lastly, 
exploratory analyses assessed the external validity of the maturity of judgment 
outcome expectancies.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Aim 1: Comparing Low Risk Adolescents vs. Adults
Maturity of Judgment Components
First, age-group and gender differences on standardized components of 
maturity of judgment were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, 
utilizing age-group (adolescent or adult) and gender as the independent 
variables, components of maturity of judgment (resistance to peer influence, 
sensation seeking, risk perception, and future-orientation) as the dependent 
variables, and average grade and SES as the covariates. Maturity of judgment 
was significantly related to age-group, and the strength of this association was 
strong (multivariate F(4, 510) = 106.67, Pillai’s Trace = .46, p < .001, n2 = .46). 
Significant univariate differences were found for peer influence (F(1, 513) = 
133.87, p < .001, n2 = .21), sensation seeking (F(1, 513) = 222.93, p < .001, n2 = 
.30), risk perception (F(1, 513) = 53.47, p < .001, r|2 = .09) and future-orientation 
(F(1, 513) = 138.25, p < .001, r\2 = .21). As seen in Table 2, pairwise 
comparisons indicated that adolescents displayed decreased resistance to peer 
influence, risk perception, and future-orientation and increased sensation seeking 
as compared to adults. Components of maturity of judgment were also 
significantly related to gender, although this association was small, as well 
(multivariate F(4, 510) = 23.56, Pillai’s Trace = .16, p < .001, n2 = .16). Males
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showed greater sensation seeking (univariate F(1, 621) = 9.46, p < .01, q2 = .01) 
and decreased risk perception (univariate F ( 1, 621) = 30.64, p < .001, n2 = .05) 
than females. However, there was not a significant age-group by gender 
interaction (multivariate F(4, 510) = 1.07, Pillai’s Trace = .01, n s , q2 = .01).
Next, age-group and gender differences on spontaneously mentioned 
outcome expectancies TO engage in antisocial behavior were assessed. Thus, a 
2 x 2  MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing age-group (adolescent or adult) and 
gender as the independent variables, outcome expectancies associated with 
immaturity of judgment (peer influence, sensation seeking, negative emotion, risk 
perception, short term, and long term consequences as reasons TO engage in 
antisocial act) as the dependent variables, and average grade and SES as the 
covariates. Maturity of judgment outcome expectancy TO engage in behavior 
was significantly related to age-group, and the strength of this association was 
moderate (multivariate F(6, 498) = 26.88, Pillai’s Trace = .25, p < .001, q2 = .25). 
Significant univariate differences were found for peer influence (F(1, 503) = 9.95, 
p < .01, q2 = .02), sensation seeking (F(1, 503) = 6.32, p < .05, q2 = 01), 
negative emotion (F(1, 503) = 49.49, p < .001, q2 = .09), risk perception (F(1, 
503) = 6.45, p < .05, q2 = .01), and short term consequence (F(1, 503) =
116.57, p < .001, q2 = .19) expectancies TO engage in antisocial acts. As seen 
in Table 3, pairwise comparisons indicated that adolescents mentioned more 
peer influence, sensation seeking, negative emotion, risk perception, and short 
term consequence outcome expectancies, but not more long range 
consequences, as reason TO engage in antisocial acts than adults.
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Maturity of judgment expectancies TO engage in antisocial behavior were 
neither significantly related to gender (multivariate F(6, 498) = 2.04, Pillai’s Trace 
= .02, n s , i f  = .02), nor to the interaction between age-group and gender 
(multivariate F(6, 498) = 1.96, Pillai's Trace = .02, n s , q2 = .02).
Lastly, age-group and gender differences on spontaneously mentioned 
outcome expectancies NOT TO engage in antisocial behavior were assessed. 
Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing age-group (adolescent or 
adult) and gender as the independent variables, outcome expectancies 
associated with immaturity of judgment (peer influence, sensation seeking, 
negative emotion, risk perception, legal, shortterm, and long term consequences 
as reasons NOT TO engage in antisocial act) as the dependent variables, and 
average grade and SES as the covariates. Maturity of judgment outcome 
expectancy NOT TO engage in behavior was significantly related to age-group, 
and the strength of this association was small (multivariate F (7, 497) = 12.54, 
Pillai’s Trace = .15, p < .001, rj2 = .21). Significant univariate differences were 
found for negative emotion (F(1, 503) = 5.45, p < .05, i f  = .01), risk perception 
(F(1, 503) = 51.36, p < .001, r|2 = .09), short term consequence (F(1, 503) =
41.12, p < .001, i f  = .08) and long term consequence (F(1, 503) = 5.24, p < .05, 
q2 = .01) expectancies NOT TO engage in antisocial acts. As seen in Table 4, 
pairwise comparisons indicated that adolescents mentioned fewer negative 
emotions and long term consequences as reasons NOT TO engage in antisocial 
acts than adults. In addition, adolescents mentioned a greater number of
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perceived risks and short term consequence outcome expectancies as reasons 
NOT TO engage in antisocial acts than adults.
Maturity of judgment expectancies NOT TO engage in antisocial behavior 
were also significantly related to gender (multivariate F(7, 497) = 2.38, Pillai’s 
Trace = .03, p < .05, q2 = .03). Significant univariate differences were found for 
negative emotion ( F (1, 503) = 7.04, p < .01, q2 = .01), risk perception (F(1, 503)
= 5.40, p < .05, q2 = .01), and short term consequence (F(1, 503) = 3.96, p <
.05, q2 = .01) expectancies NOT to engage in antisocial behavior. Females 
mentioned a greater number of negative emotions, perceived risks, and short 
term consequences than males. In addition, there was a significant age-group by 
gender interaction (multivariate F(7, 497) = 2.09, Pillai’s Trace = .03, p < .05, q2 = 
.03). A significant univariate difference was found for risk perception F(1, 503) = 
5.68, p < .02, q2 = .01), such than female adolescents mentioned the greatest 
number of perceived risks, followed by male adolescents and male adults, with 
female adults mentioning the fewest perceived risks.
Five Factors of Consequential Thinking
First, age-group and gender differences on perceived incentives were
assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing age-group 
(adolescent or adult) and gender as the independent variables, perceived 
incentive variables (total positive expectancies, operationalized peer influence, 
and anticpated peer behavior) as the dependent variables, and average grade 
and SES as the covariates. Perceived incentive variables were significantly 
related to age-group, and the strength of this association was strong (multivariate 
F(3, 472) = 107.19, Pillai’s Trace = .41, p < .001, q2 = .41). Significant univariate
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differences were found for total positive expectancies (F(1, 474) = 102.81, p < 
.001, n2 = .18), operationalized peer influence (F(1, 474) = 23.17, p < .001, r)2 = 
.05), and anticipated peer behavior (F(1, 474) = 262.26, p < .001, q2 = .36). As 
seen in Table 5, pairwise comparisons indicated that adolescents mentioned 
more perceived incentives, displayed greater discrepancies between what they 
would do and what they believed was right, and anticipated greater peer 
involvement in antisocial acts than adults. However, perceived incentives were 
not significantly related to gender, (multivariate F(3, 472) = .81, Pillai’s Trace = 
.01, n s , q2 = .01) nor to the interaction between age-group and gender 
(multivariate F(3, 472) = .98, Pillai’s Trace = .01, n s , q2 = .01).
Second, age-group and gender differences on perceived costs were 
assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing age-group 
(adolescent or adult) and gender as the independent variables, perceived cost 
variables (total negative expectancies, perceived criminal sanctions, and care if 
caught) as the dependent variables, and average grade and SES as the 
covariates. Cost expectancy variables were significantly related to age-group, 
and the strength of this association was small (multivariate F(3, 501) = 37.08, 
Pillai’s Trace = .18, p < .001, q2 = .18). Significant univariate differences were 
found for total negative expectancies (F(1, 503) = 24.93, p < .001, q2 = .05), 
perceived criminal sanctions (F(1, 503) = 13.71, p < .001, q2 = .03), and care if 
caught (F(1, 503) = 106.64, p < .001, q2 = .18). As seen in Table 5, pairwise 
comparisons indicated that adolescents mentioned fewer perceived costs, 
perceived criminal sanctions as less likely, and cared less if they were caught
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than adults. Perceived costs was significantly related to gender, (multivariate 
F(3, 325) = 2.85, Pillai’s Trace = .03, p < .05, r f  = .03). Significant univariate 
differences were found for care if caught (F(1, 503) = 9.78, p < .01, r|2 = .02), 
such that females cared more about getting caught than males. However, there 
was not a significant age-group by gender interaction (multivariate F (3, 501) =
.97, Pillai’s Trace = .01, n s , r|2 = .01).
Third, age-group and gender differences on reward biases of outcome 
expectancies were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing 
age-group (adolescent or adult) and gender as the independent variables, reward 
bias variables (benefit/cost ratio, most important expectancy, comfort threshold, 
and risk threshold) as the dependent variables, and average grade and SES as 
the covariates. Reward bias variables were significantly related to age-group, 
and the strength of this association was moderate to strong (multivariate F(4,
403) = 42.84, Pillai’s Trace = .30, p < .001, n2 = .30). Significant univariate 
differences were found for benefit to cost ratio (F(1, 406) = 92.49, p < .001, r|2 = 
.19), most important expectancy (F(1, 406) = 61.14, p < .001, rj2 = .13), comfort 
threshold (F(1, 406) = 12.50, p < .001, n2 = .03), and risk threshold (F(1, 406) = 
53.86, p < .001, n2 = .12). As seen in Table 5, pairwise comparisons indicated 
that adolescents displayed a higher benefit to cost expectancy ratio, a 
heightened importance on positive expectancies, a lower comfort threshold for 
and a higher risk threshold for willingness to engage in antisocial acts than 
adults.
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Reward bias of outcome expectancies were also significantly related to 
gender, although this association was small (multivariate F(4, 403) = 2.76, Pillai’s 
Trace = .03, p < .01, r)2 = .03). Females displayed a higher risk threshold 
(univariate F(1, 406) = 7.71, p < .01, r f  = .02) than males. However, there was 
not a significant age-group by gender interaction (multivariate F(4, 403) = 1.48, 
Pillai’s Trace = .02, n s , i f  = .02).
Fourth, age-group and gender differences on depth of processing 
variables were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing 
age-group (adolescent or adult) and gender as the independent variables, depth 
of processing variables (depth of processing and past event experience) as the 
dependent variables, and average grade and SES as the covariates. Depth of 
processing variables were significantly related to age-group, and the strength of 
this association was small (multivariate F(2, 449) = 22.14, Pillai’s Trace = .08, p < 
.001, n2 = .08). Significant univariate differences were found for depth of 
processing (F(1, 500) = 8.81, p < .01, r|2 = .02) and past event experience (F(1, 
500) = 40.37, p < .001, n2 = .08). As seen in Table 5, pairwise comparisons 
indicated that adolescents displayed greater depth of processing and more past 
event experience than adults. Depth of processing variables were not 
significantly related to gender, (multivariate F(2, 499) = .42, Pillai’s Trace = .00, 
n s , r f  =  .00) but there was a significant age-group by gender interaction 
(multivariate F(2, 499) = 7.35, Pillai’s Trace = .03, p < .01, r f  = .03). Female 
adolescents had the greatest amount of past event experience, followed by male
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adolescents, male adults, with female adults reporting the least amount of past 
event experience.
Finally, age-group and gender differences on generation of alternate 
solution variables were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, 
utilizing age-group (adolescent or adult) and gender as the independent 
variables, alternate solution variables (number of alternate solutions and number 
of non-aggressive/delinquent solutions) as the dependent variables, and average 
grade and SES as the covariates. Alternate solution variables were significantly 
related to age-group, and the strength of this association was small (multivariate 
F(2, 499) = 63.17, Pillai’s Trace = .20, p < .001, q2 = .20). Significant univariate 
differences were found for number of alternate solutions (F(1, 506) = 17.53, p < 
.01, q2 = .03) and number of non-delinquent/aggressive solutions (F(1, 506) = 
45.61, p < .001, q2 = .10). As seen in Table 5, pairwise comparisons indicated 
that adolescents generated fewer alternate solutions and fewer non­
delinquent/aggressive solutions than adults. Alternate solution variables were 
not significantly related to gender, (multivariate F(2, 499) = 1.60, Pillai’s Trace = 
.01, n s , q2 = .01) nor to the interaction between age-group and gender 
(multivariate F(2, 499) = .89, Pillai’s Trace = .00, n s , q2 = .00).
Aim 2: Comparing Low vs. High Risk Adolescents 
Maturity of Judgment Components
Delinquencv-Group. First, delinquency-group and gender differences on 
standardized components of maturity of judgment were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 
MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing delinquency-group (adolescent or
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delinquent) and gender as the independent variables, components of maturity of 
judgment (resistance to peer influence, sensation seeking, risk perception, and 
future-orientation) as the dependent variables, and average grade, IQ, and SES 
as the covariates.
Maturity of judgment was significantly related to delinquency-group, 
although the strength of this association was small (multivariate F(4, 308) = 7.40, 
Pillai’s Trace = .09, p  < .001, q2 =  .09). A significant univariate difference was 
found for risk perception (F(1, 311) = 23.46, p < .001, q2 = .07), but not for 
peer influence (F(1, 311) = .97, n s , q2 = .00), sensation seeking (F(1, 311) =
.15, n s , q2 = .00), and future-orientation (F(1, 311) = .09, n s , q2 = .00). As seen 
in Table 6, pairwise comparisons indicated that adolescents displayed increased 
risk perception as compared to delinquents. Components of maturity of 
judgment were also significantly related to gender, although this association was 
small, as well (multivariate F(4, 308) = 3.03, Pillai’s Trace = .04, p < .05, q2 =
.04). Males showed greater sensation seeking (univariate F( 1, 311) = 9.25, p < 
.01, q2 = .03) than females. However, maturity of judgment was not significantly 
related to the interaction between delinquency-group and gender (multivariate 
F(4, 311) = .74, Pillai’s Trace = .01, n s , q2 = .01).
Next, delinquency-group and gender differences on spontaneously 
mentioned outcome expectancies TO engage in antisocial behavior were 
assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing delinquency-group 
(adolescent or delinquent) and gender as the independent variables, outcome 
expectancies (peer influence, sensation seeking, negative emotion, risk
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perception, short term, and long term consequences as reason TO engage in 
antisocial act) as the dependent variables, and average grade, IQ, and SES as 
the covariates. Maturity of judgment outcome expectancies TO engage in 
antisocial acts was not significantly related to delinquency-group (multivariate 
F (6, 303) = 1.04, Pillai’s Trace = .02, n s , q2 = .202). Further, maturity of 
judgment expectancies TO engage in antisocial acts were neither significantly 
related to gender (multivariate F {6, 303) = .54, Pillai’s Trace = .02, n s , q2 = .02), 
nor to the interaction between age-group and gender (multivariate F (5, 303) = < 
.52, Pillai’s Trace = .02, n s , q2 = .02).
Third, delinquency-group and gender differences on spontaneously 
mentioned outcome expectancies NOT TO engage in antisocial behavior were 
assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing delinquency-group 
(adolescent or delinquent) and gender as the independent variables, outcome 
expectancies (peer influence, sensation seeking, negative emotion, risk 
perception, legal, short term, and long term consequences as reason NOT TO 
engage in antisocial act) as the dependent variables, and average grade, IQ, and 
SES as the covariates. As seen in Table 8, maturity of judgment outcome 
expectancies NOT TO engage in antisocial acts was not significantly related to 
delinquency-group (multivariate F(6, 303) = 1.84, Pillai’s Trace = .04, n s , q2 = 
.04). In addition, maturity of judgment expectancies NOT TO engage in 
antisocial acts were neither significantly related to gender (multivariate F (6, 303) 
= 1.77, Pillai’s Trace = .03, n s , q2 = .03), nor to the interaction between
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delinquency-group and gender (multivariate F(6, 303) = .28, Pillai’s Trace = .01, 
n s , i f  = -01).
Cut-Score Delinquency Group. Because of significant within-group 
variation in delinquency, as seen in the standard deviations on the measure of 
delinquency for both groups: adolescent (SD = 21.51) and delinquent youth (SD 
= 22.20), both groups were combined to form two categories based on 
delinquency cut-score. Those youth (whether high school youth or delinquent) 
with delinquency scores above the 50th percentile were labeled high delinquent 
and those youth (whether high school youth or delinquent) with delinquency 
scores below the 50th percentile were labeled low delinquent.
To test whether maturity of judgment was significantly related to cut-score 
delinquency group, a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was 
conducted, utilizing cut-score delinquency group (low or high) as the independent 
variable, the four separate components of maturity of judgment (resistance to 
peer influence, sensation seeking, risk perception, and future-orientation) as the 
dependent variables, and IQ, average grade, and SES as the covariates. Overall 
maturity of judgment was related to delinquency group, although the strength of 
this association was small (multivariate F(4, 298) = 15.28, p < .001, Pillai’s Trace 
= .17, r f  = .17). As seen in Table 6, univariate analyses indicated an effect of 
delinquency group on sensation seeking (F(1, 301) = 8.49, p < .01, r f  = .03), risk 
perception (F(1, 301) = 49.93, p < .001, r f  = .14) and future-orientation (F(1,
301) = 23.66, p < .001, r f  = .07), such that low delinquency youth displayed
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decreased sensation seeking and increased risk perception and future- 
orientation than high delinquency youth.
Components of maturity of judgment were also significantly related to 
gender, although this association was small, as well (multivariate F(4, 298) = 
7.14, Pillai’s Trace = .09, p < .001, r|2 = .09). Males showed greater sensation 
seeking (univariate F(1, 301) = 28.88, p < .001, r f  = .07) than females. However, 
maturity of judgment was not significantly related to the interaction between age- 
group and gender (multivariate F(4, 298) = 1.08, Pillai’s Trace = .01, n s , q2 =
.01).
In addition, cut-score delinquency group and gender differences on 
spontaneously mentioned outcome expectancies associated with maturity of 
judgment were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing cut- 
score delinquency group (low or high) and gender as the independent variables, 
outcome expectancies associated with immaturity of judgment (peer influence, 
sensation seeking, negative emotion, risk perception, short term, and long term 
consequences as reason TO engage in antisocial act) as the dependent 
variables, and average grade, IQ, and SES as the covariates. Maturity of 
judgment outcome expectancy was significantly related to cut-score delinquency 
group, although the strength of this association was small (multivariate F(6, 293) 
= 2.33, Pillai’s Trace = .05, p < .05, q2 = .05). Significant univariate differences 
were found for sensation seeking (F(1, 298) = 7.06, p < .01, r f  =  .02) 
expectancies TO engage in antisocial acts. As seen in Table 7, pairwise 
comparisons indicated that low delinquency adolescents mentioned fewer
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sensation seeking expectancies as reason TO engage in antisocial acts than 
high delinquency adolescents.
Finally, cut-score delinquency group and gender differences on 
spontaneously mentioned outcome expectancies associated with maturity of 
judgment were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing cut- 
score delinquency group (low or high) and gender as the independent variables, 
outcome expectancies associated with immaturity of judgment (peer influence, 
sensation seeking, negative emotion, risk perception, legal, shortterm, and long 
term consequences as reason NOT TO engage in antisocial act) as the 
dependent variables, and average grade, IQ, and SES as the covariates. As 
seen in Table 8, maturity of judgment outcome expectancy was not significantly 
related to cut-score delinquency group (multivariate F(6, 293) = 1.40, Pillai’s 
Trace = .03, n s , r f  = .03). Maturity of judgment expectancies NOT TO engage in 
antisocial acts was significantly related to gender, although the strength of this 
association was small (multivariate F (6, 293) = 3.87, Pillai’s Trace = .07, p < .01, 
q2 = .07). Significant univariate differences were found for risk perception (F(1, 
298) = 11.69, p < .01, q2 = .04) and short term consequence (F(1, 298) = 8.73, p 
< .01, r)2 = .03) expectancies NOT TO engage in antisocial acts. Females 
mentioned a greater number of perceived risks and short term consequences as 
reason NOT TO engage in antisocial acts than males. However, there was not a 
significant cut-score delinquency group by gender interaction (multivariate F(6, 
293) = .88, Pillai’s Trace = .02, n s , r f  =  .02).
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Five Factors of Consequential Thinking
Delinquencv-Group. First, delinquency-group and gender differences on 
perceived incentives were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, 
utilizing delinquency-group (adolescent or delinquent) and gender as the 
independent variables, perceived incentive variables (total positive expectancies, 
operationalized peer influence, and anticpated peer behavior) as the dependent 
variables, and average grade, IQ, and SES as the covariates. Perceived 
incentive variables were significantly related to delinquency-group, although the 
strength of this association was weak (multivariate F (3, 286) = 8.93, Pillai’s Trace 
= .09, p < .001, q2 = .09). Significant univariate differences were found for 
operationalized peer influence (F(1, 288) = 4.97, p < .05, r)2 = .02), and 
anticipated peer behavior (F (  1, 288) = 22.83, p < .001, q2 = .07). As seen in 
Table 9, pairwise comparisons indicated that adolescents displayed fewer 
discrepancies between what they would do and what they believed was right, 
and anticipated less peer involvement in antisocial acts than delinquent youth. 
However, perceived incentives were not significantly related to gender, 
(multivariate F (3, 286) = .88, Pillai’s Trace = .01, n s , q2 = .01) nor to the 
interaction between delinquency-group and gender (multivariate F (3, 286) = 1.17, 
Pillai’s Trace = .01, n s , q2 = .01).
Second, delinquency-group and gender differences on perceived costs 
were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing delinquency- 
group (adolescent or delinquent) and gender as the independent variables, 
perceived cost variables (total negative expectancies, perceived criminal
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sanctions, and care if caught) as the dependent variables, and average grade,
IQ, and SES as the covariates. Cost expectancy variables were significantly 
related to delinquency-group, and the strength of this association was small 
(multivariate F(3, 306) = 4.36, Pillai’s Trace = .04, p < .01, q2 =  .04). Significant 
univariate differences were found for how much one would care if caught (F(1, 
308) = 8.34, p < .01, r|2 = .03). As seen in Table 9, pairwise comparisons 
indicated that adolescents cared more if they were caught than delinquent youth. 
However, perceived costs was neither significantly related to gender,
(multivariate F(3, 306) = 2.47, Pillai’s Trace = .02, n s , q2 = .02), nor to the 
interaction between delinquency-group and gender (multivariate F(3, 306) = 2.02, 
Pillai’s Trace = .02, n s , q2 = .02).
Third, delinquency-group and gender differences on reward biases of 
outcome expectancies were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was 
conducted, utilizing delinquency-group (adolescent or delinquent) and gender as 
the independent variables, reward bias variables (benefit/cost ratio, most 
important expectancy, comfort threshold, and risk threshold) as the dependent 
variables, and average grade, IQ, and SES as the covariates. Reward bias 
variables were not significantly related to delinquency-group (multivariate F(4, 
245) = .32, Pillai’s Trace = .01, n s , q2 = 01). Nor were reward bias of outcome 
expectancies significantly related to gender (multivariate F(4, 245) = .50, Pillai’s 
Trace = .01, n s , q2 = .01), or the interaction between delinquency-group and 
gender (multivariate F(4, 245) = .86, Pillai’s Trace = .01, n s , q2 = .01).
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Fourth, delinquency-group and gender differences on depth of processing 
variables were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, utilizing 
age-group (adolescent or delinquent) and gender as the independent variables, 
depth of processing variables (depth of processing and past event experience) 
as the dependent variables, and average grade, IQ, and SES as the covariates. 
Depth of processing variables were significantly related to delinquency-group, 
and the strength of this association was small (multivariate F(2, 304) = 3.50, 
Pillai’s Trace = .02, p < .05, q2 = .02). Significant univariate differences were 
found for past event experience (F(1, 305) = 7.00, p < .01, q2 = .02). As seen in 
Table 9, pairwise comparisons indicated that adolescents reported less past 
event experience than delinquent youth. Depth of processing variables were not 
significantly related to gender, (multivariate F(2, 304) = 2.25, Pillai’s Trace = .02, 
n s , q2 = .02) nor to the interaction between delinquency-group and gender 
(multivariate F(2, 304) = .37, Pillai’s Trace = .00, n s , q2 = .00).
Finally, delinquency-group and gender differences on generation of 
alternate solution variables were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was 
conducted, utilizing delinquency-group (adolescent or delinquent) and gender as 
the independent variables, alternate solution variables (number of alternate 
solutions and number of non-aggressive/delinquent solutions) as the dependent 
variables, and average grade, IQ, and SES as the covariates. Alternate solution 
variables were not significantly related to delinquency-group (multivariate F(2, 
305) = .65, Pillai’s Trace = .00, n s , q2 = .00). Further, alternate solution variables 
were not significantly related to gender, (multivariate F(2, 305) = 1.83, Pillai’s
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Trace = .01, ns, r f  = 01) nor to the interaction between delinquency-group and 
gender (multivariate F(2, 305) = .33, Pillai’s Trace = .00, ns, r|2 = .00).
Cut-Score Delinquency Group. First, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, 
cut-score delinquency group (low or high) and gender as the independent 
variables, perceived incentive variables (total positive expectancies, 
operationalized peer influence, and anticpated peer behavior) as the dependent 
variables, and average grade, IQ, and SES as the covariates. Perceived 
incentive variables were significantly related to cut-score delinquency group, 
although the strength of this association was weak (multivariate F ( 3, 278) =
12.82, Pillai’s Trace = .12, p  < .001, r f  = .12). Significant univariate differences 
were found for total positive expectancies (F(1, 280) = 12.29, p < .01, r f  = .04)
7 and anticipated peer behavior (F(1, 281) = 30.65, p < .001, r f  =  .10). As seen in 
Table 9, pairwise comparisons indicated that low delinquency adolescents 
anticipated fewer positive expectancies associated with antisocial behavior and 
less peer involvement in antisocial acts than high delinquency adolescents. 
However, perceived incentives were not significantly related to gender, 
(multivariate F(3, 278) = .81, Pillai’s Trace = .01, ns, r f  =  .01) nor to the 
interaction between cut-score delinquency group and gender (multivariate F(3, 
278) = .37, Pillai’s Trace = .00, ns, r f  = .00).
Second, cut-score delinquency group and gender differences on 
perceived costs were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, 
utilizing cut-score delinquency group (low or high) and gender as the 
independent variables, perceived cost variables (total negative expectancies,
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perceived criminal sanctions, and care if caught) as the dependent variables, and 
average grade, IQ, and SES as the covariates. Cost expectancy variables were 
significantly related to cut-score delinquency group, and the strength of this 
association was small (multivariate F(3, 296) = 10.91, Pillai’s Trace = .10, p < 
.001, q2 = .10). Significant univariate differences were found for how much one 
would care if caught (F(1, 298) = 30.31, p < .001, q2 = .09) and perceived 
sanctions (F(1, 298) = 10.20, p < .01, q2 = .03). As seen in Table 9, pairwise 
comparisons indicated that low delinquency youth perceived criminal sanctions 
as more likely, and cared more if they were caught than high delinquency youth. 
In addition, perceived costs was significantly related to gender, (multivariate F(3, 
296) = 3.32, Pillai’s Trace = .03, p < .05, q2 = .03). Significant univariate 
differences were found for total perceived costs (F(1, 298) = 8.75, p < .01, q2 = 
.03) and how much one would care if caught (F(1, 298) = 4.58, p < .05, q2 = .02). 
Females perceived a greater number of costs associated with antisocial 
behavior, and cared more if they were caught than males. However, there was 
not a significant cut-score delinquency group by gender interaction(multivariate 
F(3, 296) = .72, Pillai’s Trace = .01, ns,  q2 = .01).
Third, cut-score delinquency group and gender differences on reward 
biases of outcome expectancies were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was ' 
conducted, utilizing cut-score delinquency group (low or high) and gender as the 
independent variables, reward bias variables (benefit/cost ratio, most important 
expectancy, comfort threshold, and risk threshold) as the dependent variables, 
and average grade, IQ, and SES as the covariates. Reward bias variables were
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significantly related to cut-score delinquency group, although the strength of this 
association was small (multivariate F(4, 241) = 10.99, Pillai’s Trace = .15, p < 
.001, q2 = .15). Significant univariate differences were found for benefit/cost ratio 
(F(1, 244) = 7.78, p < .01, q2 = .03), most important expectancy (F(1, 244) =
21.89, p < .001, n2 = -08), and risk threshold (F(1, 244) = 23.33, p < .001, i f  = 
.09). As seen in Table 9, pairwise comparisons indicated that low delinquency 
adolescents held a smaller benefit to cost ratio, placed a decreased importance 
on positive expectancies, and displayed a lower risk threshold for willingness to 
engage in antisocial acts than high delinquency adolescents. However, reward 
bias of outcome expectancies were not significantly related to gender 
(multivariate F(4, 241) = 1.83, Pillai’s Trace = .03, ns ,  r f  = .03), nor to the 
interaction between cut-score delinquency group and gender (multivariate F(4, 
241) = .64, Pillai’s Trace = .01, ns ,  i f  = .01).
Fourth, cut-score delinquency group and gender differences on depth of 
processing variables were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was conducted, 
utilizing cut-score delinquency group (low or high) and gender as the 
independent variables, depth of processing variables (depth of processing and 
past event experience) as the dependent variables, and average grade, IQ, and 
SES as the covariates. Depth of processing variables were significantly related 
to cut-score delinquency group, and the strength of this association was small 
(multivariate F(2, 294) = 24.38, Pillai’s Trace = .14, p < .001, i f  = .14).
Significant univariate differences were found for past event experience (F(1, 295) 
= 47.52, p < .001, r f  = .14). As seen in Table 9, pairwise comparisons
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indicated that low delinquency adolescents reported less past event experience 
than high delinquency adolescents. In addition, depth of processing variables 
were significantly related to gender, (multivariate F(2, 294) = 5.14, Pillai’s Trace = 
.03, p < .01, q2 = .03). Significant univariate differences were found for depth of 
processing (F(1, 295) = 5.11, p < .05, q2 = .02) and for past event experience 
(F(1, 295) = 4.87, p < .05, q2 = .02). Females displayed deeper depth of 
processing and reported more past event experience than males. However, 
there was not a significant cut-score delinquency group by gender interaction 
(multivariate F(2, 294) = .11, Pillai’s Trace = .00, n s ,  q2 = .00).
Finally, cut-score delinquency group and gender differences on generation 
of alternate solution variables were assessed. Thus, a 2 x 2 MANCOVA was 
conducted, utilizing cut-score delinquency group (low or high) and gender as the 
independent variables, alternate solution variables (number of alternate solutions 
and number of non-aggressive/delinquent solutions) as the dependent variables, 
and average grade, IQ, and SES as the covariates. Alternate solution variables 
were not significantly related to cut-score delinquency group (multivariate F(2, 
295) = 1.47, Pillai’s Trace = .01, ns,  q2 = .01). However, alternate solution 
variables were significantly related to gender, (multivariate F(2, 295) = 3.66, 
Pillai’s Trace = .02, p < .05, q2 = .02). Significant univariate differences were 
found for number of alternate solutions (F(1, 296) = 6.97, p < .01, q2 = .02) and 
number of non-delinquent/aggressive solutions (F(1, 296) = 6.92, p < .01, q2 = 
.02). Females generated a greater number of alternate solutions and a greater 
number of non-delinquent/aggressive alternate solutions than males. However,
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there was not a significant cut-score delinquency group by gender interaction 
(multivariate F(2, 295) = .60, Pillai’s Trace = .00, ns ,  r\2 =  .00).
Aim 3: Adolescent and Adult Differences in Variable Associations.
The final set of planned analyses assessed adolescent and adult 
differences in predictors of delinquency. Delinquent youth were not included in 
the reported analyses, as potential cohort differences of these youth go beyond 
the scope of this study. At the same time, all analyses in this set were also run 
including delinquent youth within the adolescent group, and identical results were 
attained.
First, analyses assessed which theoretical variable was most predictive of 
delinquency in adolescents and in adults. Second, a model in which 
consequential thinking mediated the relation between immature judgment 
outcome expectancies and delinquency was tested in adolescents and in adults. 
Finally, a series of OLS regressions tested the interaction between being an 
adolescent and several theoretically significant independent variables in 
predicting delinquency.
For this set of analyses, several composite variables were created by 
averaging standardized scores on pertinent variables: maturity of judgment 
scales (composite of standardized scales for Resistance to Peer Influence, 
Sensation Seeking (reverse coded), Risk Perception, and Future-Outlook 
Inventory), immaturity of judgment outcome expectancies (average of 
presence/absence scores for peer influence, sensation seeking, negative 
emotion, risk perspective, and short term consequences as reason TO engage in
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behavior), pro-delinquency (composite of scores for total positive expectancies, 
benefit/cost ratio, and depth of processing), and anti-delinquency (composite of 
scores for total negative expectancies and total alternate solutions).
For all analyses, the demographic variables that were correlated with 
delinquency were entered on Step 1, and the relevant independent variable(s) 
were then entered on Step 2. Thus, if differences in the dependent variable(s) 
were attributable to differences in the independent variable, then any significant 
effect at stage one should become non-significant at stage two.
Variable Most Highly Associated With Total Delinquency. For 
adolescents, a hierarchical regression was conducted, entering IQ, gender, 
average grade, education level, and SES on step one and composite of maturity 
scales (Resistance to Peer Influence, Sensation Seeking (reverse coded), Risk 
Perception, and Future-Outlook Inventory), immaturity of judgment outcome 
expectancies (peer influence, sensation seeking, negative emotion, risk 
perspective, and short term consequences as reason TO engage in behavior), 
and two variables encompassing consequential thinking: pro-delinquency (total 
positive expectancies, benefit/cost ratio, and depth of processing) and anti­
delinquency (total negative expectancies and total alternate solutions) on step 
two. As seen in Table 10, on step one gender and average grade were 
significant predictors of delinquency, with a moderate relation between the 
demographic variables and total delinquency ( F ( 5, 239) = 30.13, p < .001; 
Adjusted R2 = .23). Once the composite of maturity of judgment scales, maturity 
of judgment outcome expectancies, and two consequential thinking variables
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were entered into the second step of the equation, composite of maturity of 
judgment scales, pro-delinquency composite, and average grade were 
significant, strong predictors of delinquency (F(9, 235) = 27.72, p < .001;
Adjusted R2 = .50; R2 = .25 for Step 1; AR2 = .27 for Step 2 (p < .001).
Composite of maturity of judgment scales O = -.43) was a stronger predictor of 
total delinquency than pro-delinquency composite (|3 = .31) and average grade (P 
= .30).
For adults, a hierarchical regression was conducted, entering gender, 
education level, and SES on step one and composite of maturity scales 
(Resistance to Peer Influence, Sensation Seeking (reverse coded), Risk 
Perception, and Future-Outlook Inventory), maturity of judgment outcome 
expectancies (peer influence, sensation seeking, negative emotion, risk 
perspective, and short term consequences as reason TO engage in behavior), 
and two variables encompassing consequential thinking: pro-delinquency (total 
positive expectancies, benefit/cost ratio, and depth of processing) and anti­
delinquency (total negative expectancies and total alternate solutions) on step 
two. As seen in Table 10, on step one gender was a significant predictor of 
delinquency, with a weak relation between the demographic variables and total 
delinquency (F(3, 250) = 3.78, p < .01; Adjusted R2= .03). Once the composite 
of maturity of judgment scales, maturity of judgment outcome expectancies, and 
two consequential thinking variables were entered into the second step of the 
equation, composite of maturity of judgment scales ((3 = -.23) was a significant,
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weak predictor of delinquency (F {7 ,  246) = 4.74, p < .001; Adjusted R2 = .03; R2 
= .04 for Step 1; AR2 = .08 for Step 2 (p < .001).
Pro-Delinquency Consequential Thinking Composite Mediating Maturity of 
Judgment Outcome Expectancies and Delinquency. Baron and Kenney’s (1986) 
regressional techniques allows for testing the relation between two variables, X 
and Z. The mediating model occurs when the two variables X and Z are related 
directly but have a weakened relation when a third variable Y is included in the 
regression. First, the pro-delinquency consequential thinking composite was 
regressed on the composite of immature judgment outcome expectancies. Next 
total delinquency was regressed on the composite of immature judgment 
outcome expectancies. Finally, a regression was conducted with the composites 
of immature judgment outcome expectancies and pro-delinquency consequential 
thinking as the independent variables and total delinquency as the dependent 
variable. Further, demographic variables associated with delinquency were 
controlled for in all analyses by entering them on Step 1 of the regression 
equation and entering the predictor variables on Steps 2 and 3.
To test the mediating model for adolescents, a hierarchical regression was 
conducted, entering the demographic variables (IQ, gender, average grade, 
education level, and SES) associated with delinquency on step one and the 
composite of immature judgment outcome expectancies (peer influence, 
sensation seeking, negative emotion, risk perspective, and short term 
consequences as reason TO engage in behavior) on step two. As seen in Table 
11, none of the demographic variables were significant in predicting the pro-
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delinquency composite on step 1 (total positive expectancies, benefit/cost ratio, 
and depth of processing) (F(5, 248) = 1.86, ns; Adjusted R2= .02). Once the 
composites of immature judgment outcome expectancies was entered into the 
second step of the equation, average grade and composite of immature 
judgment outcome expectancies was a moderate to strong predictor of pro­
delinquency (composite of total positive expectancies, benefit/cost ratio, and 
depth of processing) (F(6, 247) = 19.30, p < .001; Adjusted R2 = .30; R2 = .04 for 
Step 1; AR2 = .28 for Step 2 (p < .001).
Second, a hierarchical regression was conducted, entering the 
demographic variables (IQ, gender, average grade, education level, and SES) 
associated with delinquency on step one and the composite of immature 
judgment outcome expectancies (peer influence, sensation seeking, negative 
emotion, risk perspective, and short term consequences as reason TO engage in 
behavior) on step two. As seen in Table 12, gender and average grade were 
significant on step one, with a moderate relation between the demographic 
variables and total delinquency (F(5, 239) = 15.91, p < .001; Adjusted R2= .23). 
Once the composite of immature judgment outcome expectancies was entered 
into the second step of the equation, the composite of immaturity judgment 
outcome expectancies, gender, and average grade were significant, moderate 
predictors of total delinquency (F(6, 238) = 17.81, p < .001; Adjusted R2 = .29; R2 
= .25 for Step 1; AR2 = .06 for Step 2 (p < .001).
Third, a hierarchical regression was conducted, entering the demographic 
variables (IQ, gender, average grade, education level, and SES) associated with
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delinquency on step one, the composites of immature judgment outcome 
expectancies (peer influence, sensation seeking, negative emotion, risk 
perspective, and short term consequences as reason TO engage in behavior) on 
step 2, and pro-delinquency consequential thinking (total positive expectancies, 
benefit/cost ratio, and depth of processing) on step three. As seen in Table 13, 
gender and average grade were significant on step one, with a moderate relation 
between the demographic variables and total delinquency (F(5, 239) = 15.91, p <  
.001; Adjusted R2 = .23). Once the composite of immature judgment outcome 
expectancies was entered into the second step of the equation, immature 
judgment outcome expectancies, gender, and average grade were significant, 
moderate predictors of delinquency (F(6, 238) = 17.81, p < .001; Adjusted R2 = 
.29). On the third step of the equation, gender, average grade, and pro­
delinquency consequential thinking were significant, strong predictors of 
delinquency (F(7, 237) = 19.52, p < .001; Adjusted R2 = .35; R2 = .31 for Step 2; 
AR2 = .06 for Step 3 (p < .001). The composite of immature judgment outcome 
expectancies became insignificant when total delinquency was regressed on 
both the composites of pro-delinquency consequential thinking and immature 
judgment outcome expectancies (see Figure 1). To test whether the reduction in 
immature judgment outcome expectancies was significant, a Sobel test was 
performed. The result showed that the test statistic was significant (z = 4.14, p < 
.001). Thus, for adolescents, the relation between immature judgment outcome 
expectancies and delinquency was significantly mediated by consequential 
thinking.
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To test the mediating model for adults, a hierarchical regression was 
conducted, entering the demographic variables (gender, education level, and 
SES) associated with delinquency on step one and the composite of immature 
judgment outcome expectancies (peer influence, sensation seeking, negative 
emotion, risk perspective, and short term consequences as reason TO engage in 
behavior) on step two. As seen in Table 11, none of the demographic variables 
significantly predicted pro-delinquency composite (total positive expectancies, 
benefit/cost ratio, and depth of processing) (F(3, 250) = 5.27, p  < .01; Adjusted 
R2 = .05). Once the composites of immature judgment outcome expectancies 
was entered into the second step of the equation, the composite of immature 
judgment outcome expectancies was a strong predictor of pro-delinquency 
(composite of total positive expectancies, benefit/cost ratio, and depth of 
processing) (F(4, 249) = 49.45, p < .001; Adjusted R2 = .43; R2 = .06 for Step 1; 
AR2 = .38 for Step 2 (p < .001).
Second, a hierarchical regression was conducted, entering the 
demographic variables (gender, education level, and SES) associated with 
delinquency on step one and the composite of immature judgment outcome 
expectancies (peer influence, sensation seeking, negative emotion, risk 
perspective, and short term consequences as reason TO engage in behavior) on 
step two. As seen in Table 12, gender was significant on step one, with a weak 
relation between the demographic variable and total delinquency (F(3, 250) = 
3.78, p < .05; Adjusted R2 = .03). Once the composite of immature judgment 
outcome expectancies was entered into the second step of the equation, the
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composite of immaturity judgment outcome expectancies and gender were 
significant, weak predictors of total delinquency (F(4, 249) = 4.30, p  < .01; 
Adjusted R2 = .05; R2 = .04 for Step 1; AR2 = .02 for Step 2 (p < .05).
Third, a hierarchical regression was conducted, entering the demographic 
variables (gender, education level, and SES) associated with delinquency on 
step one, the composites of immature judgment outcome expectancies (peer 
influence, sensation seeking, negative emotion, risk perspective, and short term 
consequences as reason TO engage in behavior) on step 2, and pro-delinquency 
consequential thinking (total positive expectancies, benefit/cost ratio, and depth 
of processing) on step three. As seen in Table 13, gender was significant on 
step one, with a weak relation between the demographic variables and total 
delinquency (F(3, 250) = 3.78, p  < .05; Adjusted R2 = .03). Once the composite 
of immature judgment outcome expectancies was entered into the second step of 
the equation, gender and immature judgment outcome expectancies was a 
significant weak predictor of delinquency (F(4, 249) = 4.33, p < .01; Adjusted R2 
= .05). On the third step of the equation, gender was a significant, weak 
predictor of delinquency (F(5, 248) = 3.98, p < .01; Adjusted R2 = .06; R2 = .07 for 
Step 2; AR2 = .01 for Step 3 (p = ns ) .  Because neither the composite of 
immature judgment outcome expectancies nor the composite of pro-delinquency 
consequential thinking remained significant when predicting total delinquency, for 
adults, the relation between immature judgment outcome expectancies and 
delinquency was not mediated by consequential thinking (see Figure 2).
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Alternate Mediational Model. To ensure that immature judgment outcome 
expectancies was not acting as a mediator of the consequential thinking-total 
delinquency relation, a reverse mediational model was executed for both 
adolescents and adults. For adolescents, in this model, the initial relation 
between consequential thinking and delinquency was significant ((3 = .34, t  =
6.40, p < .001); however, this direct path was not reduced to a non-significant 
level once immature judgment was included in the model ((3 = .29, t  = 4.57, p < 
.001). For adults, in this model, the initial relation between consequential 
thinking and delinquency was significant (f3 = .17, t  = 2.75, p < .01); however, 
although this direct path was reduced to a non-significant level once immature 
judgment was included in the model ((3 = .13, t  = 1.58, p = ns ) ,  immature 
judgment expectancies was also non-significant (|3 = .07, t  = .85, p = ns ) .  Based 
on these results, there was no support for an alternate mediating model.
Theoretically Significant Independent Variable by Adolescent Interactions.
A series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions tested the interaction 
between being an adolescent and several theoretically significant independent 
variables in predicting delinquency. Based on analyses conducted under Aim 1 
and Aim 2, the following independent variables were run as interactions with the 
dummy variable of adolescent (1 = adolescent, 0 = adult): total positive 
expectancies, most important consequence, anticipated peer behavior, perceived 
criminal sanctions, care if caught, risk threshold, and past event experience. In 
order to interpret differences in benefit/cost ratio, total negative expectancies was 
also included in the analyses.
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The OLS regressions were run with demographic control variables on the 
first step of the equation: adolescence (dummy coded variable adolescent or 
not), gender, SES, average grade, and education level. Age was not included in 
the regressions as the variable had a large variance-inflation factor (VIF) and 
was determined to be unnecessary with the inclusion of the adolescence 
variable. All predictor variables and the mediator variable were entered on the 
second step of the equation. The product term was then entered on the third 
step of the equation.
First, an OLS regression was run with unstandardized variables, for ease 
in comprehension of the remaining analyses. As seen in Table14, for model 1, 
on step 2, average grade, total positive expectancies, anticipated peer behavior, 
care if caught, and past event experience were significant strong predictors of 
delinquency (F(13, 411) = 38.37, p  < .001; Adjusted R2 = .53; R2 = .39 for Step 1; 
AR2 = .16 for Step 2 (p < .001). The same OLS regression was then run with all 
independent and dependent variables standardized. All further analyses were 
based on standardized variables, with the exception of the dummy-coded 
variable “adolescent or not”.
Next, a series of models (2 - 9) were run to determine which of the 
independent variables had a unique effect on adolescents versus adults. In turn, 
OLS regressions were run with the following interaction terms: total positive 
expectancies x adolescence, total costs x adolescence, most important 
consequence x adolescence, anticipated peer behavior x adolescence, perceived
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criminal sanctions x adolescence, care if caught x adoiescence, risk threshold x 
adolescence, and past event experience x adolescence.
As seen in Table 14 (see Figures 3-8), the interactive effects of total 
positive outcome expectancies x adolescence (B = .34), most important 
consequence x adolescence (B  =  .27) anticipated peer behavior x adolescence 
(B = .31), care if caught x adolescence (B = -.42), risk threshold x adolescence 
(B = .12) and past event experience x adolescence (B = .32) were all significant 
predictors of total delinquency. However, the interactions between total costs x 
adolescence and criminal sanctions x adolescence were not significantly 
predictive of delinquency.
The significant interaction terms for positive outcome expectancies, 
emphasizing positive outcomes, anticipating high peer delinquency, caring little if 
caught, having a high threshold for risk, and more past event experience showed 
that the regression slopes for adolescents differed significantly from that of adults 
in predicting delinquent behavior. The next set of analyses tested whether the 
simple slopes for adolescents and for adults significantly differed from zero. For 
all analyses, adolescent regression slopes significantly differed from zero, while 
adult regression slopes did not: total positive outcome expectancies (Adolescents = 
5.75, p < .001; Adults = -.45, n s ) ,  most important consequence (Adolescents = 4.93, p 
< .001; Adults = -1.8, n s ) ,  anticipated peer behavior (Adolescents = 5.17, p < .001;
Adults = -1.46, n s ) ,  care if caught (Adolescents = -5.93, p < .001; Adults = 1 -42, ns ) ,  risk 
threshold (Adolescents = 2.30, p < .05; Adults = -.63, n s ) ,  and past event experience 
(Adolescents = 6.78, p < .001, Adults -63, HS).
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Exploratory Analyses: Measurement.
Little previous research has measured outcome expectancies associated 
with maturity of judgment in association with antisocial decision making. Thus, 
this study attempts to measure several concepts associated with maturity of 
judgment for the first time, to the author’s knowledge. To understand whether 
maturity of judgment outcome expectancies were associated with standardized 
judgment scales, a series of bivariate correlations were run.
As seen in Table 15, outcome expectancies associated with reasons TO 
engage in behavior were significantly correlated with several judgment scales. 
Peer influence was negatively associated with the Resistance to Peer Influence 
Scale (RPIS) (r = -.14) and positively associated with the Sensation Seeking 
Scale (r= .09) (SSS). Sensation seeking was positively associated with the SSS 
( r =  .12), and negatively associated with the Risk Perception Scale (RPS) ( r =  - 
.18) and the Future-Outlook Inventory (FOI) (r=  .12). Negative emotion was 
negatively associated with RPIS (r= -.12), RPS, (r = -.11) and FOI (r =  -.15) and 
positively associated with SSS (r=  .17). Risk perception was positively 
associated with SSS (r= .13). Shortterm consequences was negatively 
associated with RPIS ( r =  -.25), RPS (r -  -.25), and FOI (r= -.15) and positively 
associated with SSS (r= .26). However, long term consequences as reason TO 
engage in antisocial behavior was not significantly correlated with any of the 
maturity of judgment scales.
Also seen in Table 15, outcome expectancies associated with reasons 
NOT TO engage in behavior were significantly correlated with several judgment
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scales. Peer influence was negatively associated with the Resistance to Peer 
Influence Scale (RPIS) ( r =  -.08). Negative emotion was negatively associated 
with SSS (r= -.14), and positively associated RPS, (r=  .17) and FOI ( r =  .17). 
Risk perception was negatively associated with RPIS (r= -.16) and positively 
associated with SSS (r =  .11). Legal consequence was negatively associated 
with SSS ( r  = -.09) and positively associated with RPIS (r = .11). Short term 
consequences was negatively associated with RPIS (r = -.11). Long term 
consequences was negatively associated with SSS (r =  -.08) and positively 
associated with RPS (r= .10). However, sensation seeking as a reason NOT TO 
engage in antisocial behavior was not associated with any of the judgment 
scales.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The present study brings together diverse areas of research to investigate 
the relations between maturity of judgment, consequential thinking, and 
delinquency in adolescents, adults, and delinquent youth. Results suggest that • 
adolescents and adults may differ significantly on the judgment factors that 
influence their decisions and their decision processes. In addition, research 
shows few adolescent within-group differences in judgment and several within- 
group differences in consequential thinking. Finally, adolescent and adult 
differences may exist in the content and patterns of variables associated with 
delinquency.
Results Summary
Results suggest that adolescents may be less mature than adults based 
on maturity of judgment scale measures and numerous maturity of judgment 
outcome expectancy measures. In addition, adolescents were found to be less 
mature than adults based on all aspects related to consequential thinking: 
perceived incentives, perceived loss potential, reward structures, depth of 
processing, and generation of response solutions.
Adolescents were found to be more mature than delinquent youth only on 
two of the four maturity of judgment scales, sensation seeking and risk
87
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
perception, and did not differ from delinquent youth on any of the seven 
immature judgment outcome expectancies. Further, adolescents were found to 
be more mature than delinquent youth on only three aspects related to 
consequential thinking: operationalized peer influence, anticipated peer antisocial 
behavior, and how much cared if caught.
However, low delinquency youth were found to be more mature than high 
delinquency youth based on three of the four maturity of judgment scales: 
sensation seeking, risk perception, and future-orientation scales. In addition, low 
delinquency youth were found to be more mature than high delinquency youth on 
one of the seven immature judgment outcome expectancies; low delinquency 
youth were less likely to mention sensation seeking expectancies as reason TO 
engage in antisocial behavior. Finally, low delinquency youth were found to be 
more mature than high delinquency youth on numerous factors related to 
consequential thinking: total positive expectancies, anticipated peer antisocial 
behavior, perceived criminal sanctions, how much cared if caught, benefit/cost 
ratio, most important expectancy, and risk threshold.
The final set of planned analyses assessed adolescent and adult 
differences in variables associated with delinquency. Results showed that, for 
adolescents, maturity of judgment scales and pro-delinquency consequential 
thinking were associated with delinquency beyond demographic effects. For 
adults, only maturity of judgment scales were associated with antisocial behavior 
beyond the effects of demographic variables. In addition, consequential thinking 
mediated the relation between immature judgment outcome expectancies and
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delinquency for adolescents, but not adults. Lastly, OLS regressions revealed 
that total positive consequences, emphasis on positive consequences, 
anticipated peer antisocial behavior, caring if caught, having a high risk 
threshold, and past event experience wera all uniquely associated with 
delinquent behavior for adolescents, as a group.
Exploratory analyses also assessed the external validity of the maturity of 
judgment outcome expectancies. Bivariate correlations showed that all pertinent 
outcome expectancies were associated with maturity scales in expected 
directions.
Aim 1: Comparing Low Risk Adolescents vs. Adults
(1) Maturity of judgment components
As hypothesized, adolescents showed decreased risk perception, future- 
orientation and resistance to peer influence and increased sensation seeking on 
standardized measures, as compared to adults. This finding is in-line with 
previous maturity of judgment research (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; Modecki, 
in press) that focused on responsibility, temperance, and perspective, but is also 
notable based on the use of more specific scales in this study: risk perception, 
future-orientation, resistance to peer influence, and sensation seeking.
Further, in line with the immaturity of judgment hypothesis, adolescents 
spontaneously mentioned a greater number of outcome expectancies associated 
with immature judgment (peer influence TO, sensation seeking TO, negative 
emotion TO, risk perception TO, and short term consequences TO engage in 
antisocial behavior), and fewer outcome expectancies associated with mature
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judgment (risk perception NOT TO, legal consequences NOT TO, and long term 
consequences NOT TO engage in antisocial behavior) than adults. These 
results suggest that adolescents’ immaturity of judgment may be reflected in their 
outcome expectancies for antisocial behavior, also providing further support for 
adolescent and adult differences in antisocial decision making.
(2) Five factors of consequential thinking
A) As hypothesized, adolescents perceived greater benefits in antisocial 
behavior than adults. This result was consistent across three separate measures 
of perceived benefits: number of positive outcome expectancies, operationalized 
peer influence, and perceived peer antisocial behavior. This finding suggests 
that adolescent antisocial decisions may be based partially on expected benefits 
of illicit behavior. Further, the finding that adolescents perceive benefits to 
antisocial actions which exceed those of adults implies that adolescent decision 
making may not necessarily be “illogical”, but instead may reflect differential 
adolescent values and goals, as compared to adults.
B) As posited, adolescents underestimated negative consequences 
associated with antisocial behavior as compared to adults, as measured by three 
different indices. Adolescents mentioned fewer negative outcome expectancies 
of antisocial behavior, predicted negative and legal consequences of behavior 
(being caught, arrested, etc.) as less likely, and cared less about getting caught 
than adults. The second finding, that adolescents underestimate the likelihood of 
negative and legal consequences of behavior, is of particular interest from a 
policy perspective. Increasing the likelihood that adolescents will be caught while
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committing antisocial acts may serve to decrease antisocial behavior. At the 
same time, the latter result is particularly striking from a prevention/intervention 
perspective. If adolescents simply care less about being caught, then it is 
questionable how additional rules or penalties would serve to make adolescents 
care more. That is, do adolescents care less because they believe the 
consequences are not severe enough to warrant care? It seems unlikely that 
harsher penalties alone would increase adolescent’s concerns about getting 
caught. Instead, it is more likely that lack of future hopefulness and/or lack of 
true understanding of the implications for their future may lead adolescents to 
discount the ramifications of being caught. Future research is warranted in this 
area. At the same time, these results suggest that adolescents’ antisocial 
decisions may be fairly “rational”, in that they consider negative consequences 
less likely, less severe, and care less about them, as compared to adults.
C) In agreement with the study’s hypothesis, adolescents displayed a 
positive reward bias in antisocial decision making as compared to adults. 
Adolescents mentioned a higher positive to negative outcome expectancy, 
attached greater importance to positive than negative consequences of behavior, 
and stated that they would have to feel “less good” about engaging in an 
antisocial behavior than adults. These results suggest that interventions aimed 
at changing adolescent decisions should focus on perceived benefits of behavior, 
as adolescents emphasize positive over negative outcome expectancies. In 
addition, that adolescents are willing to feel “less good” about their decisions 
before engagement, warrants further attention. In particular, research should
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consider whether this threshold can be increased. It is possible that if 
adolescents perceived negative consequences as more likely, then adolescents 
would not only care more about getting caught, but would also require a higher 
threshold for “feeling good” about their decisions before engagement. Again, this 
pattern of findings highlights the need for continued research.
D) Contrary to the study’s hypotheses, adolescents both displayed a 
greater depth of processing and reported more past event experience than 
adults. The former finding runs contrary to past research on risky decision 
making (Beyth-Marom, et al., 1993), but may be the result of different procedures 
employed in past studies versus the present. Because this study asked 
participants to list both reasons to and not to engage in behavior, as opposed to 
asking participants to simply list consequences of engaging in the behavior, a 
more thorough picture of adolescent depth of processing may be presented in 
the current study (Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992). Indeed, the current study’s 
results are in line with a recent summary of research on decision theory and 
adolescent risk decisions (Reyna & Farley, 2006), suggesting that mature 
decision making is often more “gist based” than deliberative. Further, the Reyna 
and Farley (2006) review argues that adolescents learn more from experience 
when there is a lack of negative outcomes, and that adolescents then go on to 
modify their risk perceptions downward.
E) As predicted, adolescents generated fewer response solutions and 
fewer non-delinquent/aggressive response solutions than adults. This result is 
in-line with the immaturity of judgment perspective and parallels past findings on
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medical decision making (Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman, 2001). This aspect of 
consequential thinking has been successfully targeted for intervention vis a vis 
the social information-processing model of aggressive decision making (Guerra & 
Slaby, 1990), and thus may be a worthwhile focus for more general antisocial 
decision making programming.
Aim 2: Comparing Low vs. High Risk Adolescents
The current study compared low versus high risk adolescents in two ways. 
First, high school students and delinquent youth were compared. Second, both 
adolescent samples (high school students and delinquent youth) were combined, 
and a delinquency cut-score was created to form two groups (low versus high 
delinquency), which were then contrasted. Overall, the former comparisons 
resulted in fewer differences than the later comparisons, a finding that is in-line 
with previous maturity of judgment research comparing non-delinquent and 
delinquent youth (Modecki, in press). Indeed, the delinquency group variable is 
likely impacted by extraneous factors that determine who is caught, prosecuted, 
and convicted. Whereas the self-report measure of delinquency likely provides a 
more accurate assessment of antisocial behavior.
(1) Maturity of judgment components
In terms of maturity of judgment differences on standardized scales, 
adolescents and delinquents differed only on the measure of risk perception, 
such that adolescents perceived behaviors as more risky than delinquent youth. 
Although the standardized risk perception scale targeted risky behaviors 
(engaging in sexual intercourse without a condom, driving with a drunk driver) as
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opposed to antisocial behaviors, it may be that delinquent youth have, as 
discussed earlier, decreased their risk expectancies based on failure to 
experience negative outcomes from their risky acts in the past.
In addition, adolescents and delinquent youth did not differ on any 
outcome expectancies associated with immature judgment (peer influence TO, 
sensation seeking TO, negative emotion TO, risk perception TO, and short term 
consequences TO engage in antisocial behavior) or mature judgment (risk 
perception NOT TO, legal consequences NOT TO, and long term consequences 
NOT TO engage in antisocial behavior). As mentioned above, this result is not 
unsurprising, in light of potential confounds with the delinquency-group variable.
However, for low and high delinquency adolescents, differences in 
maturity of judgment were found on all standardized scales, with the exception of 
resistance to peer influence. Low delinquency youth displayed stronger risk 
perception and future orientation and lower sensations seeking compared to high 
delinquency youth. These results largely support the immaturity of judgment 
hypothesis, although the lack of differences on the resistance to peer influence 
measure is surprising. Because this scale was modified from the original version 
for reasons of improved reliability, it may be that scale lacks external validity. 
Prior research has struggled to create a peer influence scale with strong internal 
and external validity (Berndt, 1999) although a recent laboratory-based 
manipulation of peer influence has shown promise (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005).
At the same time, low and high delinquency youth differed only on the 
sensation seeking immature judgment outcome expectancy, and did not differ on
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any outcome expectancies related to mature judgment (risk perception NOT TO, 
legal consequences NOT TO, and long term consequences NOT TO engage in 
antisocial behavior). Low delinquency youth were less likely to mention 
sensation seeking as a reason TO engage in behavior than high delinquency 
youth. This finding of sensation seeking differences supports the notion that 
adolescents are particularly susceptible to suboptimal emotional regulation, 
which in turn is associated with internalizing and externalizing problems 
(Steinberg, 2005). At the same time, the lack of significant differences on the 
remaining outcome expectancies implies that this method of measurement may 
not be the best indicator of adolescent within-group differences. This study 
utilized the method of presence versus absence of judgment factors. It may be 
that because adolescents, as a group, tend to mention judgment-related factors, 
within group differences in valence would be a stronger indicator of delinquency.
(2) Five factors of consequential thinking
A) Adolescents and delinquent youth did not differ on total number of 
positive expectancies, but did differ on the remaining two perceived incentive 
indices: operationalized peer influence and anticipated peer behavior. The 
finding of no differences between adolescents and delinquent youth on total 
number of positive consequences runs contrary to the study’s hypothesis, and 
may be a result of confounds with the delinquency-group measure. At the same 
time, the peer-based results suggest that detained youth may more susceptible 
to peer pressure than non-detained adolescents, a finding that runs contrary to
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Fried and Reppucci (2001) who found that detained youth predicted less 
pressure from peers in antisocial situations than non-detained youth.
However, low delinquency youth reported fewer positive outcome 
expectancies and anticipated that peer antisocial behavior was less likely than 
high delinquency youth. Yet there were no cut-score delinquency differences on 
operationalized peer influence. The first result is in-line with the hypothesis that 
over-emphasis on positive consequences is associated with adolescent 
delinquency. This finding also suggests that youth decision making programs 
should focus on reducing the perceived positive consequences associated with 
delinquency, as opposed to asking youth to focus on perceived negative 
consequences.
In addition, low delinquency youth anticipated their peers would be less 
likely to engage in antisocial behavior than high delinquency youth. Along with 
the anticipated peer differences found in delinquent and non-delinquent youth 
above, this pattern of results proposes that perceived peer behavior is an 
important factor in adolescent delinquency, a finding that is supported within the 
criminological literature (e.g. Jessor & Jessor,1977). Finally, the finding that low 
and high delinquency youth did not differ on the operationalized peer influence 
measure may be due to the mechanism by which the measure was calculated. 
Low and high delinquency youth may differ in their beliefs regarding how wrong 
an action is, and then go on to engage or not engage in the behavior based on 
said belief. That is, high delinquency youth may not believe that shoplifting is 
wrong, and then state that they would definitely shoplift. This pattern would
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result in a low score on operationalized peer influence, similar to low delinquency 
youth believing that a behavior is wrong and then stating that they would 
definitely not shoplift. Future research would benefit from differential 
operationalizations of peer influence on behavior.
B) Neither adolescents versus delinquent youth nor low versus high 
delinquency adolescents differed on number of perceived costs of delinquent 
behavior. This result runs contrary to past research on adolescent risk-taking 
(e.g. Jacobs-Quadrel et al., 1993). However, along with the results showing 
adolescent within-group differences on perceived benefits, this pattern of findings 
reinforces the current study’s premise that for adolescents, benefits, as opposed 
to costs, are a predominate focus for antisocial decisions (Parsons, Siegel, & 
Cousins, 1997).
Further, results showed that adolescents versus delinquent youth and low 
versus high delinquency adolescents cared more about getting caught for 
antisocial behavior. Again, this pattern of findings implies that simply increasing 
penalties against juveniles likely will not alter delinquent behavior. Instead, it 
may be the perceived benefits of behavior, in addition to a lack of future 
hopefulness or current opportunities that drives delinquent behavior.
At the same time, there were no differences between adolescents and 
delinquent youth on perceived criminal sanctions. Once more, this suggests that 
increasing punitive sanctions may not ameliorate adolescent antisocial decision 
making. However, low delinquency youth perceived criminal sanctions as more 
likely than high delinquency youth. This later finding is in-line with Guerra (1989)
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and suggests that a sub-group of adolescents that engage in little, if any, 
delinquent behavior may over-estimate potential sanctions in comparison to 
youth who have more delinquent experience.
C) No differences were found between adolescents and delinquent youth 
on measures of reward bias: benefit/cost ratio, most important expectancy, 
comfort threshold, and risk threshold. This finding is unexpected, and suggests 
that the delinquency-group variable is confounded with differences in those who 
are caught and prosecuted within the justice system versus those who are not. 
This conclusion is supported further with the subsequent finding that low and 
high delinquency youth differed on three of four aspects of reward bias: 
benefit/cost ratio, most important expectancy, and risk threshold. Low 
delinquency youth perceived a lower benefit to cost ratio, were less likely to 
emphasize positive over negative consequences, and had a lower threshold for 
risk than high delinquency youth. Again, these results suggest that adolescent 
decision making might be improved (or at least, less delinquent) via a marked de­
emphasis on positive consequences. Finally, low and high delinquency groups 
did not differ on the comfort threshold needed to engage in behavior. It may be 
that sensation seeking and other positive emotions may drive delinquent 
behavior, as opposed to feelings such as fear and guilt. This idea is supported 
by the finding of no differences between adolescents and delinquents or between 
low and high delinquency youth on negative emotion outcome expectancies 
associated with antisocial behavior.
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D) Findings indicated no differences between adolescents and delinquent 
youth on depth of processing, but adolescents did report less past event 
experience than delinquent youth. This is an unexpected finding, and it may be 
that more extensive processing depth could be related to situational novelty for 
adolescents and related to consideration of past consequences of antisocial 
behavior for delinquent youth. This idea is further supported based on the finding 
of no differences in depth of processing between low and high delinquency 
groups, although low delinquency youth reported less past event experience than 
high delinquency youth.
E) Results showed no differences between adolescents and delinquents 
or between low and high delinquency youth on number of alternate solutions 
generated nor on number of non-delinquent/aggressive alternate solutions 
generated. The former result is surprising, as youth who are caught and 
incarcerated would seem to have fewer response options at their disposal than 
those who circumvent detection. In addition, both findings run contrary to Guerra 
and Slaby (1990), and may be due to the fact that the current study did not group 
individuals based on levels of aggression.
Aim 3: Adolescent and Adult Differences in Variable Associations 
Variable Most Highly Associated With Total Delinquency
For adolescents, composites of maturity of judgment scales and pro­
delinquency consequential thinking factors were associated with delinquency; 
whereas for adults, only the composite of maturity of judgment scales was 
associated with delinquency. The former finding supports the current study’s
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theses, endorsing both the maturity of judgment and social information- 
processing perspectives. The latter result, although not in-line with the study’s 
original hypothesis, advocates for the theory that mature judgment may be based 
on more gist-like processing, as opposed to a thorough decision analysis (Reyna 
& Farley, 2006). Such conclusions warrant attention for intervention 
programming, as deliberate, thorough analyses may be less important to mature 
decisions than previously considered.
Pro-Delinquency Consequential Thinking Composite Mediating Maturity of 
Judgment Outcome Expectancies and Delinquency
For adolescents, the pro-delinquency consequential thinking composite 
mediated the association between the composite of immature judgment outcome 
expectancies and delinquency. For adults, this relation did not exist: when both 
consequential thinking and outcome expectancies were entered into the 
regression equation, neither was significant. This study’s finding of support for 
the mediation hypothesis bolsters the thesis that maturity of judgment and social 
information-processing perspectives are related, and that both are associated 
with adolescent antisocial decision making. This finding is particularly important 
in terms of social information-processing based interventions. Youth 
programming may improve decision making by focusing on immaturity of 
judgment based benefits of antisocial behavior: peer influence, sensation 
seeking, negative emotion, risk perception, and short term consequences.
The lack of support for the mediating model for adults is only partially in 
accordance with the study’s hypotheses. Although consequential thinking did not
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mediate the relation between immature judgment outcome expectancies and 
delinquency in adults, immature judgment expectancies were associated with
V
antisocial behavior in adults. Along with the above finding that maturity of 
judgment was the only theoretical independent variable associated with 
delinquency in adults, results show that maturity of judgment may be associated 
with delinquency even in adults ages 35-63. Previous cross-sectional research 
has shown that the general judgment factors of responsibility and perspective 
remains relatively stable after age 18, but the factor of temperance may continue 
to mature through young-adulthood (Modecki, in press). Future research should 
consider which specific aspects of judgment continue to affect adult antisocial 
decisions.
Theoretically Significant Independent Variable by Adolescent Interactions
Several variables associated with consequential thinking were associated 
with delinquency for adolescents but not for adults: total positive consequences, 
emphasis on positive expectancies, anticipated peer antisocial behavior, caring if 
caught, and past event experience all were associated with total delinquent 
behavior for adolescents, as a group, but not adults. The first three results 
provide support for the notion that perceived benefits of antisocial behavior may 
be a particularly fruitful intervention focus for adolescent decision making. In 
addition, the later two interaction results, caring if caught and past event 
experience, reinforce the notion that improved monitoring of adolescents and 
enforcement of set consequences for antisocial behavior may serve to improve 
adolescent decision making.
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Exploratory Analyses: Measurement
This study was unique in its inclusion of coding for maturity of judgment 
content for positive and negative expectancies of antisocial behavior. Results 
provide support for the operationalizations that were utilized in the current study, 
showing external validity for the factor coding. All immature judgment outcome 
expectancies were significantly associated with judgment scales. In particular, 
peer influence was negatively associated with the Resistance to Peer Influence 
Scale (RPIS), sensation seeking was positively associated with the Sensation 
Seeking Scale (SSS), and short term consequence was negatively associated 
with the Future-Outlook Inventory. Although risk perception was not significantly 
associated with the Risk Perception Scale (RPS), there was a positive 
association between the risk perception outcome expectancy and SSS.
Further, the negative emotion immature judgment outcome expectancy 
was included in the study, based on its relation to the “gestalt” of immature 
judgment. Findings indicated that negative emotion was negatively associated 
with RPIS, RPS, and FOI and positively associated with SSS. In all, the results 
of the exploratory analyses, along with the above analyses showing the 
predictive usefulness of immature judgment outcome expectancies on 
delinquency, provides support for further use of qualitative judgment measures in 
decision making research.
Final Remarks
The current study is germane to policy makers and courts. The juvenile 
justice system is based on the premise of adolescent immaturity of judgment,
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suggesting reduced culpability for crimes and increased amenability to 
rehabilitation (Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996). However, the juvenile and adult 
court systems remain tenuously separate, as evidenced by the roughly 200,000 
adolescents who are tried in adult criminal court annually (Allard & Young, 2002). 
The current project investigates age-based differences in maturity of judgment 
and perceived consequences of antisocial decisions. This study’s findings 
provide support for potential adolescent and adult differences in their antisocial 
decision processes. Adolescents display increased peer influence and sensation 
seeking and decreased risk perception and future-orientation than adults. In 
addition, adolescent decision processes are, to a significantly larger degree than 
adults, based on content that can be categorized as immature. Further, although 
adolescent decision processing has been shown to be deeper than that of adults, 
adolescents engage in a less mature decision process, based primarily on a 
biased reward structure that emphasizes positive over negative consequences.
The results of the current study do suggest that adolescents, as a group, 
differ markedly from adults in their antisocial decision process. These findings 
propose decreased decision making competence, and parallel neurobiological 
conclusions that suggest a positive/emotional reward bias in adolescents 
(Steinberg, 2004). In all, results support legislation for adolescent-specific versus 
adult-based sanctions (Fried & Reppucci, 2001). A predominate finding of this 
study is that adolescents, as a group, are particularly inclined to focus on benefits 
of antisocial behavior over risks. It has been hypothesized that lack of 
adolescent supervision and surveillance may add to this propensity, through
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adolescent’s downward adjustment of risk after “getting away” with antisocial 
behavior (Reyna & Farley, 2006). This idea is further supported by the finding of 
adolescent within-group differences (both adolescent vs. delinquent and low vs 
high delinquency youth) on the standardized risk perception measure. Thus, 
possible adolescent-specific policies include increased supervision and 
monitoring through community surveillance and policing and regular enforcement 
of less severe consequences. At the same time, large scale attempts to “get 
tough on adolescents” and “treat adolescents as adults” may, in many ways, 
make it less likely that adolescents will a) received positive reinforcement for 
making social, as opposed to antisocial decisions and b) receive consistent and 
reasonable punishments for their infractions.
In light of the study’s conclusions, it is also important to note that the 
study’s design has several limitations. First, there were significant cohort 
differences between the adolescent and adults groups. The adult sample in this 
study was comprised of parents of college students and thus was likely a more 
highly educated group than would be found in a community-based sample. 
Although SES was controlled for in all analyses that compared adolescents and 
adults, the findings of the current study must be considered in light of these 
group differences. Findings of differences between adolescents and adults may 
not be due entirely to age differences, and instead may due to educational and 
socio-economic differences between groups. Second, this work attempts to 
investigate a developmental construct though the use of sampling, and thus is 
limited by its cross-sectional nature. While a mediational model was tested, the
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lack of longitudinal data prohibits establishing causal pathways for variables in 
the models. Future research should attempt to follow individuals over time, from 
middle school through adulthood, in order to understand developmental changes 
in immature judgment, consequential thinking, and antisocial decisions. Further, 
subsequent work should attempt to measure constructs through experimental, as 
opposed to self-report questionnaire methods. An example of such research is 
that of Gardner and Steinberg (2005) who successfully measured peer influence 
and risk perception through experimental techniques. In addition, forthcoming 
work should attempt to corroborate decision making research with brain-based 
findings. Although this study’s hypotheses were influenced by physiological 
research, tests of the developmental nature of adolescent decisions should 
ideally be linked to biological changes over the course of adolescence.
Finally, there were several measurement issues that may have affected 
the study’s results (Frazier et al., 2004). First, in the mediational analyses for 
both adolescents and adults, the Path a relation between the predictor (immature 
judgment expectancies) and the dependent variable (total delinquency)
(^ adolescents = -25, paduits = 1 5 )  was less than the Path b relation between the 
predictor (immature judgment expectancies) and the mediator (pro-delinquency 
consequential thinking) (Padoiescents = -54, Paduits = -64). For adolescents, the Path 
a relation was not so strong that multicollinearity was a problem. However, the 
strong Path a relation for adults suggests potential problems with 
multicollinearity.
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Second, two scales that were utilized in the current study had low 
reliabilities (below a = .70): anticipated peer behavior (a = .65) and past event 
experience (a = .51). Although low reliability may reduce the power of statistical 
tests (Frazier et al., 2004), moderator analyses involving the low reliability scales 
were still significant for adolescents. Thus, the two variables in question still 
provided statistically significant regression results, although results should be 
interpreted with caution.
Third, multiple moderators were tested in the third set of analyses, and 
multiple correlations were tested in the exploratory analyses of the study. These 
procedures increased the likelihood of Type 1 error, and again, results should be 
construed with cautiousness.
Never the less, this work has significant, direct applications for behavioral 
interventions (Nightingale & Fischhoff, 2002). Numerous delinquency and 
violence prevention programs advise individuals to “stop and think” before they 
act (Orobio de Castro, Bosch, Veerman, & Koops, 2003). Such curriculums 
assume that a guided extension of children’s thought process will result in 
improved decision making, (e.g. Knoff, 2000; Larson & Gerber, 1987; Mann et 
al., 1989). These programs have been widely implemented within US school 
systems; for example, Project ACHIEVE (Knoff, 2000) has been incorporated into 
more than 1500 schools (Project Achieve, n.d.). The current study informs such 
programs by highlighting specific aspects of adolescent antisocial decision 
making that may be deficient. For instance, adolescents may be instructed to
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consider the negative ramifications associated with an antisocial act, but remain 
highly biased in their perception of positive consequences of antisocial behavior.
The results of this study offer the potential to strengthen existing 
interventions by focusing on domains most central to the endorsement of 
antisocial decisions in adolescents: outcome expectancies related to peers, 
sensation seeking, short term benefits, and lack of risk and emphasis on said 
positive consequences.
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Please circle the answer that best describes you.
A. What is your primary racial background?
(1.) African American
(2.) Native American (Indian)
(3.) Asian American 
(4.) Caucasian (white)
(5.) Hispanic American
(6.) Mixed African American and white
(7.) Mixed Hispanic American and white
B. How old are you?
___________________ years old
C. What is your gender?
(1) Male (2) Female






E. What is the last full grade that you have completed in school?
(1). 6th grade or less(5.) 10th grade
(2.) 7th grade (6.) 11th grade
(3.) 8th grade (7.) GED
(4.) 9th grade (8.) 12th grade
F. For the last full year you have completed in school, what was your average 
grade?
(1.) All A ’s
(2.) Primarily A ’s and B’s 
(3.) All B’s
(4.) Primarily B’s and C’s 
(5.) All C’s
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(6.) Primarily C’s and D’s 
(7.) All D’s
(8.) Primarily D’s and F’s 
(9.) All F’s
G. Highest level of education attained by your mother:
(0.) Don’t know/Not sure
(1.) Less than high school/GED
(2.) High school
(3.) Some college education
(4.) Associate Degree (2 year college)
(5.) College degree (4 year college)
(6.) Some graduate education
(7.) Graduate or professional degree (Ph.D MD MBA MA)
H. Highest level of education attained by your father:
(0.) Don’t know/Not sure
(1.) Less than high school/GED
(2.) High school
(3.) Some college education
(4.) Associate Degree (2 year college)
(5.) College degree (4 year college)
(6.) Some graduate education
(7.) Graduate or professional degree (Ph.D MD MBA MA)
I. Were you ever convicted of a crime as a juvenile?
(Does not include speeding ticket)
(1.) Yes (2.) No
J. If yes, how many tim es?____________________
K. Have you ever been convicted of a crime as an adult?
(Does not include speeding ticket)
(1.) Yes (2.) No
L. If yes, please circle the type of conviction 
(1) Misdemeanor (2.) Felony
M. Have you ever stayed in a detention center (such as the Youth Development 
Center) previously?
(1.) Yes (2.) No
N. If yes, how many times (including this time)? _______________ times
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O. How old were you when (if) you were first involved with the law? For 
example, got picked up by the police, went to community court, or something like 
that?
___________ years old
A lte rn a te  d e m o g ra p h ic  q u e s t io n s  f o r  a d u lts :
F . F o r  th e  la s t  fu l l  y e a r  y o u  c o m p le te d  in  h ig h  s c h o o l,  w h a t  w a s  y o u r  a v e ra g e  
g ra d e ?
(1 .)  A l l  A ’s
(2 .)  P r im a r i ly  A ’s  a n d  B ’s  
(3 .)  A l l  B ’s
(4 .)  P r im a r i ly  B ’s  a n d  C ’s  
(5 .)  A l l  C ’s
(6 .)  P r im a r i ly  C ’s  a n d  D ’s  
(7 .)  A l l  D ’s
(8 .)  P r im a r i ly  D ’s  a n d  F ’s  
(9 .)  A l l  F ’s
G. H ig h e s t  le v e l  o f  e d u c a t io n  y o u  h a v e  re c e iv e d :
(0 .)  D o n ’t  k n o w /N o t  s u re
(1 .)  L e s s  th a n  h ig h  s c h o o l/G E D
(2 .)  H ig h  s c h o o l
(3 .)  S o m e  c o lle g e  e d u c a t io n
(4 .)  A s s o c ia te  D e g re e  (2  y e a r  c o lle g e )
(5 .)  C o lle g e  d e g re e  (4  y e a r  c o lle g e )
(6 .)  S o m e  g ra d u a te  e d u c a t io n
(7 .)  G ra d u a te  o r  p ro fe s s io n a l d e g re e  (P h .D  M D  M B A  M A )
H . H ig h e s t  le v e l  o f  e d u c a t io n  y o u r  s p o u s e  h a s  re c e iv e d :
(0 .)  D o n ’t  k n o w /N o t  s u re
(1 .)  L e s s  th a n  h ig h  s c h o o l/G E D
(2 .)  H ig h  s c h o o l
(3 .)  S o m e  c o lle g e  e d u c a t io n
(4 .)  A s s o c ia te  D e g re e  (2  y e a r  c o lle g e )
(5 .)  C o lle g e  d e g re e  (4  y e a r  c o lle g e )
(6 .)  S o m e  g ra d u a te  e d u c a t io n
(7 .)  G ra d u a te  o r  p r o fe s s io n a l d e g re e  (P h .D  M D  M B A  M A )
A lte rn a te  d e m o g ra p h ic  q u e s t io n s  f o r  d e l in q u e n t  a d o le s c e n ts :
J. H o w  m a n y  t im e s  h a v e  y o u  b e e n  c o n v ic te d  o f  a  d e lin q u e n c y , to ta l  ( in c lu d in g  
th is  t im e )?
Verbal IQ
RESEARCHER READS ALOUD:
I am going to say some words. Listen carefully, and write what each word means 
on the lines provided on your survey.
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1. What is a cow?
2. What is an alphabet?
3. What is a donkey?
4. What is a thief?
5. What does leave mean?
6. What does brave mean?
7. What is an island?
8. What does ancient mean?
9. What does nonsense mean?
10. What does absorb mean?
11. What is a fable?
12. What does precise mean?
13. What does migrate mean?
14. What does mimic mean?
15. What does transparent mean?
16. What does strenuous mean?
17. What does boast mean?
18. What does unanimous mean?
19. What does seclude mean?
20. What does rivalry mean?
21. What is an amendment?
22. What does compel mean?
23. What does affliction mean?
24. What does imminent mean?
25. What does aberration mean?
26. What does dilatory mean?
A lte rn a te  V e rb a l IQ  in s t ru c t io n s  f o r  d e l in q u e n t  a d o le s c e n ts :
I  a m  g o in g  to  s a y  s o m e  w o rd s . L is te n  c a re fu lly ,  a n d  te l l  m e  w h a t  e a c h  w o rd  
m e a n s .
A d d it io n a l V e rb a l IQ  q u e s t io n s  f o r  d e l in q u e n t  a d o le s c e n ts :
2 7 . W h a t is  a  c lo c k ?
2 8 . W h a t is  a  h a t?
2 9 . W h a t is  a n  u m b re lla ?
3 0 . W h a t is  a  b ic y c le ?
Operationalized Peer Influence (OPI)
Please check an answer for each below.
1. How wrong is it to tell a friend what questions will be on an upcoming test if 
you have already taken the test?
Not wrong at all A little wrong Pretty wrong Very wrong
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2. How wrong is it to take clothing from a store without paying for it?
Not wrong at all A little wrong Pretty wrong Very wrong
3. How wrong is it to threaten some teenagers who are being loud in a movie 
theatre?
Not wrong at all A little wrong Pretty wrong Very wrong
Decision Vignettes
1. You and a friend have the same history test but are in different classes. You 
have history in the morning while she/he has history in the afternoon. At lunch, 
your friend asks you to tell her/him what questions were on the test. You realize 
that your friend has a good reason for not studying, but you know you shouldn't 
tell the test questions.
A. Would you tell your friend the test questions, or follow the rule of not revealing 
test questions? (Circle One)
1 2
Definitely Probably
tell friend the tell friend
the question the question
B. When you are deciding what to do, what are the reasons that would make you 







C. When you are deciding what to do, what are the reasons that would make 
















D. Not all reasons are important when you make a decision. Please go back to 
your reasons above and circle the ONE MOST important reason for your 
decision. All together, circle only ONE reason.
E. About how much experience do you have with this type of decision? Please 
circle ALL the responses that apply:
a. I don’t know anyone who has had to make this kind of decision.
b. People I know have had to make this kind of decision.
c. Close friends or family have had to make this kind of decision.
d. I’ve had to make this kind of decision once.
e. I’ve had to make this kind of decision more than once.
Now think about what other things you could do if your friend asked you to tell 
her/him the test questions.
F. What are some other things you could do? List all of the things you could do 






G. Let’s say that you decided to tell your friend the questions. How likely do 
you think it is that:
You will get caught by your teacher?
1 2 3 4 5
Very Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Very
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
If you are caught, that you will get in trouble?
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1 2 3 4 5
Very Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Very
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
If you are caught, you will be suspended from school?
1 2 3 4 5
Very Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Very
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
H. How much would you care if you were caught?
1 2  3 4
Not at all A little Some what Very much
I. How good would you have to feel about sharing the test questions before you 
would do it? (Please mark with an X)
You would 
have to feel 
really bad 
about doing this 
1
You would 
have to feel 
really good 
about doing this 
5
J. How likely would it have to be that you would get caught for you to decide NOT 
to share the questions? (Mark with an X)
0% 50% 100%
K. How likely would your friends be to share the questions?
1 2 3 4
Very unlikely Some what Some what Very much
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
2. You’re out shopping with some of your close friends and they decide to take 
some clothing without paying for it. You don’t think it’s a good idea, but they say 
you should take something too.
A. Would you shoplift or would you refuse to take the item? (Circle One)
1 2  3 4
Definitely Probably Probably Definitely
refuse refuse shoplift shoplift
to shoplift to shoplift
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B. When you are deciding what to do, what are the reasons that would make you 







C. When you are deciding what to do, what are the reasons that would make 







D. Not all reasons are important when you make a decision. Please go back to 
your reasons above and circle the ONE MOST important reason for your 
decision. All together, circle only ONE reason.
E. About how much experience do you have with this type of decision? Please 
circle ALL the responses that apply:
a. I don’t know anyone who has had to make this kind of decision.
b. People I know have had to make this kind of decision.
c. Close friends or family have had to make this kind of decision.
d. I’ve had to make this kind of decision once.
e. I’ve had to make this kind of decision more than once.
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F. Now think about what other things you could do if your friends said that you 
should take some clothing. What are some other things you could do? List all of 
the things you could do to solve this problem.
2 .
3.
G. Let’s say that you decided to take the clothing with your friends. How likely 
do you think it is that:
You will get caught by the police?
1 2 3 4 5
Very Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Very
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
If you are caught, that you will be found guilty of a crime?
1 2 3 4 5
Very Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Very
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
You will spend time in detention or a correctional facility?
1 2 3 4 5
Very Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Very
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
H. How much would you care if you were caught?
1 2  3 4
Not at all A little Some what Very much
I. How good would you have to feel about stealing the clothing before you would 
do it? (Please mark with an X)
You would You would
have to feel have to feel
really bad really good
about doing this about doing this
1 5
J. How likely would it have to be that you would get caught for you to decide NOT 
to steal the clothing? (Mark with an X)
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0% 50% 100%
K. How likely would your friends be to steal the clothing?
1 2  3 4
Very unlikely Some what Some what Very much
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
3. You and your friend are at a movie theatre watching a film. Behind you two 
teens are talking, laughing loudly, and kicking the back of your seat all of the 
time. Your friend wants you to turn around and threaten to hit them if they don’t 
keep quiet. \
A. Would you threaten the teens or would you refuse? (Circle One)
1 2 3 4
Definitely Probably Probably Definitely
refuse refuse threaten them threaten them
B. When you are deciding what to do, what are the reasons that would make 







C. When you are deciding what to do, what are the reasons that would make 
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5.
6 .
D. Not all reasons are important when you make a decision. Please go back to 
your reasons above and circle the ONE MOST important reason for your 
decision. All together, circle only ONE reason.
E. About how much experience do you have with this type of decision? Please 
circle ALL of the responses that apply:
a. I don’t know anyone who has had to make this kind of decision.
b. People I know have had to make this kind of decision.
c. Close friends or family have had to make this kind of decision.
d. I’ve had to make this kind of decision once.
e. I’ve had to make this kind of decision more than once.
Now think about what other things you could do if your friend wanted you to 
threaten to hit some teens.
F. What are some other things you could do? List all of the things you could do 






G. Let’s say that you decided to threaten them. How likely do you think it is that:
You will get caught by the police?
1 2 3 4 5
Very Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Very
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
If you are caught, that you will be found guilty of a crime?
1 2 3 4 5
Very Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Very
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
135
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
You will spend time in detention or a correctional facility?
1 2 3 4 5
Very Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Very
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
H. How much would you care if you were caught?
1 2  3 4
Not at all A little Somewhat Very much
I. How good would you have to feel about threatening the teens before you would 
do it? (Please mark with an X)
You would You would
have to feel have to feel
really bad really good
about doing this about doing this
1 5
J. How likely would it have to be that you would get caught for you to decide NOT 
to threaten the teens (Mark with an X)
0% 50% 100%
K. How likely would your friends be to threaten the teens?
1 2 3 4
Very unlikely Some what Some what Very much
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
4. Describe a situation that happened to you in the last three months where you 
had to make a decision about something that was against the rules or illegal. 
Write about what you decided to do and why.
A. What did you decide to do?
B. When you were deciding what to do, what were the reasons that made you 









C. When you were deciding what to do, what were the reasons that made you 







D. Not all reasons are important when you make a decision. Please go back to 
your reasons above and circle the ONE MOST important reason for your 
decision. All together, circle only ONE reason.
E. About how much experience do you have with this type of decision? Please 
circle ALL the responses that apply:
a. I don’t know anyone who has had to make this kind of decision.
b. People I know have had to make this kind of decision.
c. Close friends or family have had to make this kind of decision.
d. I’ve had to make this kind of decision once.
e. I’ve had to make this kind of decision more than once.
F. What are some other ways that you could have solved your problem? Please 
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G. If you chose to break the rule/law, how likely did you think it would be that:
You would get caught?
1 2 3 4 5
Very Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Very
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
If you were caught, that you would be found guilty of a crime?
1 2 3 4 5
Very Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Very
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
You would spend time in detention or a correctional facility?
1 2 3 4 5
Very Somewhat Not sure Somewhat Very
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
H. How much would you have cared if you were caught?
1 2 3 4
Not at all A little Some what Very much
I. How good would you have to feel about breaking the rule/law before you would 
do it? (Please mark with an X)
You would You would
have to feel have to feel
really bad really good
about doing this about doing this
1 5
J. How likely would it have to be that you would get caught for you to decide NOT 
to break the rule/law? (Mark with an X)
0% 50% 100%
K. How likely would your friends be to break the rule/law?
1 2 3 4
Very unlikely Some what Some what Very much
Unlikely unlikely likely likely
A lte rn a te  d e c is io n  v ig n e t te  f o r  a d u lts :
1. Y o u  a n d  a  f r ie n d  h a v e  th e  s a m e  w o rk  r e la te d  te s t  b u t  h a v e  i t  a t  d if fe re n t  t im e s . 
Y o u  h a v e  y o u r  t e s t  in  th e  m o r n in g  w h ile  s h e /h e  h a s  h e rs /h is  in  th e  a f te rn o o n . A t
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lu n c h , y o u r  f r ie n d  a s k s  y o u  to  te l l  h e r /h im  w h a t  q u e s t io n s  w e re  o n  th e  te s t. Y o u  
re a liz e  th a t  y o u r  f r ie n d  h a s  a  g o o d  re a s o n  f o r  n o t  s tu d y in g , b u t  y o u  k n o w  y o u  
s h o u ld n 't  te l l  th e  te s t  q u e s t io n s .
Future Outlook Inventory
Please read each sentence carefully and circle the number that you most agree 
with
1 .1 will keep working at difficult, boring tasks if I know they will help me get 
ahead later.
1 2  3 4
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
2 .1 live each day as if it’s my last. 
1 2
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
3 .1 think about how things might be in the future. 
1 2  3
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
4 . 1 tend to get caught up in the excitement of the moment.
1 2 3
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
5 .1 make lists of things to do.
1 2
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
6. Before making a decision, I weigh the good vs. the bad. 
1 2  3 4
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
7 .1 will give up my happiness now so I can get what I want in the future.
1 2 3 4
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
8 .1 make decisions on the spur of the moment.
1 2 3
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
9 .1 would rather save my money for a rainy day than spend it now on something 
fun.
10. I can’t really plan for the future because things change so much.
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1 2  3 4
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
11.1 always seem to be doing things at the last minute.
1 2 3 4
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
1 2 .1 don’t plan; I take each day as it is.
1 2  3 4
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
13. I can see my life 10 years from now.
1 2  3 4
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
14. I usually think about consequences before I do something. 
1 2  3 4
Never true Rarely true Often true Always true
Revised Resistance to Peer Influence Scale (RPIS)
How much does this describe you?
1. Some people go along with their friends just to keep them happy. 
1 2  3 4
Not at Somewhat Sort of Very much
all like me like me like me like me
2. Some people think it’s more important to be an individual than to fit in with the 
crowd.
1 2 3 4
Not at Somewhat Sort of Very much
all like me like me like me like me
3. For some people, it’s pretty easy for their friends to get them to change their 
mind.
1 2  3 4
Not at Somewhat Sort of Very much
all like me like me like me like me
4. Some people would do something that they knew was wrong just to stay on 
their friends’ good side.
1 2  3 4
Not at Somewhat Sort of Very much
all like me like me like me like me
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5. Some people hide their true opinion from their friends if they think they will be 
made fun of because of it.
1 2  3 4
Not at Somewhat Sort of Very much
all like me like me like me like me
6. Some people will not break the law just because their friends would. 
1 2  3 4
Not at Somewhat Sort of Very much
all like me like me like me like me
7. Some people change the way they act so much when they are with their 
friends that they wonder who they “really are".
1 2  3 4
Not at Somewhat Sort of Very much
all like me like me like me like me
8. Some people take more risks when they are with their friends than they do 
when they are alone.
1 2  3 4
Not at Somewhat Sort of Very much
all like me like me like me like me
9. Some people say things they don’t really believe because they think it will 
make their friends respect them more.
1 2 3 4
Not at Somewhat Sort of Very much
all like me like me like me like me
10. Some people think it’s better to be an individual even if people will be angry 
at them for going against the crowd.
1 2  3 4
Not at Somewhat Sort of Very much
all like me like me like me like me
Arnett Sensation Seeking Inventory (ASSI)
1. I can see how it would be interesting to marry someone from a foreign country. 
1 2  3 4
Does not Does not Describes Describes me
describe me describe me me somewhat very well
at all very well
2. When the water is very cold, I prefer not to swim even if it’s a hot day.
1 2 3 4
Does not Does not Describes Describes me
describe me describe me me somewhat very well
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at all very well
3. If I have to wait in a long line, I’m usually patient about it.
1 2  3 4
Does not Does not Describes Describes me
describe me describe me me somewhat very well
at all very well
4. When I listen to music, I like it to be loud.
1 2  3 4
Does not Does not Describes Describes me
describe me describe me me somewhat very well
at all very well
5. When taking a trip, I think it is best to make as few plans as possible and just 
take it as it comes.
1 2  3 4
Does not Does not Describes Describes me
describe me describe me me somewhat very well
at all very well
6 . 1 stay away from movies that are said to be frightening or highly suspenseful.
1 2  3 4
Does not Does not Describes Describes me
describe me describe me me somewhat very well
at all very well
7. I think it’s fun and exciting to perform or speak before a group. 
1 2  3 4
Does not Does not Describes Describes me
describe me describe me me somewhat very well
at all very well
8. If I were to go to an amusement park, I would prefer to ride the rollercoaster or 
other fast rides.
1 2  3 4
Does not Does not Describes Describes me
describe me describe me me somewhat very well
at all very well
9. I would like to travel to places that are far away and strange.
1 2 3 4
Does not Does not Describes Describes me
describe me describe me me somewhat very well
at all very well
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10 .1 would never like to gamble with money, even if I could afford it. 
1 2  3 4
Does not Does not Describes Describes me
describe me describe me me somewhat very well
at all very well
11.1 would have enjoyed being one of the first explorers of an unknown land. 
1 2 3 4
Does not Does not Describes Describes me
describe me describe me me somewhat very well
at all very well













1 3 .1 don’t like extremely hot and spicy foods.
1 2 3
Does not Does not Describes
describe me describe me me somewhat
at all very well
Describes me 
very well
14. In general, I work better when I’m under pressure.
1 2 3
Does not Does not Describes
describe me describe me me somewhat
at a l l . very well
Describes me 
very well
15. I often like to have the radio or TV on while I’m doing something else, such as 
reading or cleaning up.
1 2  3 4
Does not Does not Describes
describe me describe me me somewhat
at all very well
Describes me 
very well
16. It would be interesting to see a car accident happen. 
1 2 3
Does not Does not Describes
describe me describe me me somewhat
at all very well
Describes me 
very well
17. I think it’s best to order something familiar when eating at a restaurant.
1 2  3 4
Does not Does not Describes Describes me
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describe me describe me me somewhat very well
at all very well
18. I like the feeling of standing next to the edge on a high 
down.
1 2 3
Does not Does not Describes
describe me describe me me somewhat
at all very well
19. If it were possible to visit another planet or the moon for free, I would be 
among the first in line to sign up.
1 2
Does not Does not
describe me describe me
at all very well
20. I can see how it must be exciting to 
1 2
Does not Does not
describe me describe me
at all very well
Delinquency Scale
How many times is the last year have you:
1. Purposely damaged or destroyed property belonging to your parents or 
family members.
2. Purposely damaged or destroyed property belonging to a school.
3. Purposely damaged or destroyed other property that did not belong to 
you (not counting family or school property).
4. Stolen (or tried to steal) a motor vehicle, such as a car or motorcycle.
5. Stolen (or tried to steal) something worth more than $50.
6. Knowingly bought, sold or held stolen goods (or tied to do any of these 
things).
7. Thrown objects (such as rocks, snowballs, or bottles) at cars or people.
8. Carried a weapon other than a plain pocket knife.
9. Stolen (or tried to steal) things worth $5 or less.
10. Attacked someone with the idea of seriously hurting or killing him/her.
11. Been paid for having sexual relations with someone.
12. Been involved in gang fights.
13. Sold marijuana or hashish (“pot”, “grass”, “hash”).
14. Hitchhiked when it was illegal to do so.
15. Stolen money or other things from your parents or other members of 
your family.




me somewhat very well
be in a battle during a war.
3 4
Describes Describes me
me somewhat very well
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17. Hit (or threatened to hit) one of your parents.
18. Hit (or threatened to hit) other students.
19. Been loud, rowdy, or unruly in a public place (disorderly conduct).
20. Sold hard drugs, such as heroin, cocaine, and LSD.
21. Taken a vehicle for a ride (drive) without permission.
22. Had (or tried to have) sexual relations with someone against their will.
23. Used force (strong-arm methods) to get money or things from other 
students.
24. Used force (strong-arm methods) to get money or things from a teacher 
or other adult at school.
25. Used force (strong-arm methods) to get money or things from people 
(not students or teachers).
26. Avoided paying for things such as movies, bus or subway rides, and 
food.
27. Been drunk in a public place.
28. Stolen (or tried to steal) things worth between $5 and $50.
29. Stolen (or tried to steal) something at school, such as someone’s coat 
from a classroom, locker, or cafeteria, or a book from the library.
30. Broken into a building or vehicle (or tried to break in) to steal something 
or to look around.
31. Begged for money or things from strangers.
32. Failed to return extra change that a cashier gave you by mistake.
33. Made obscene telephone calls, such as calling someone and saying 
dirty things.
34. Used alcoholic beverages (beer, wine, and hard liquor).
35. Used marijuana-hashish (“grass”, “pot”, “hash”).
36. Used hallucinogens (“LSD”, “Mescaline”, “Peyote”, “Acid”).
37. Used amphetamines (‘Uppers”, “Speed”, “Whites”).
38. Used barbiturates (“Downers”, “Reds”).
39. Used heroin (“Horse”, “Smack”).
40. Used cocaine (“Coke").
A lte rn a te  d e l in q u e n c y  s c a le  in s t ru c t io n s  f o r  d e l in q u e n t  a d o le s c e n ts :
In  th e  y e a r  b e fo re  y o u  w e re  d e ta in e d  a t  th e  Y D C , h o w  m a n y  t im e s  d id  y o u :
A lte rn a te  d e l in q u e n c y  s c a le  q u e s t io n s  f o r  a d u lts :
1. P u r p o s e ly  d a m a g e d  o r  d e s t r o y e d  p ro p e r ty  b e lo n g in g  to  y o u r  fa m ily  
m e m b e rs .
2 . N o t  in c lu d e d  o n  a d u lt  s c a le .
3. P u r p o s e ly  d a m a g e s  o r  d e s t r o y e d  o th e r  p ro p e r ty  th a t  d id  n o t  b e lo n g  to  
y o u  (n o t  c o u n t in g  fa m ily  p ro p e r ty ) .
16. N o t  in c lu d e d  o n  a d u lt  s c a le .
17. H it  ( o r  th re a te n e d  to  h it )  o n e  o f  y o u r  c h ild re n .
18. H it  ( o r  th re a te n e d  to  h it )  a n o th e r  in d iv id u a l ( n o t  y o u r  c h ild re n ) .
2 9 . S to le n  ( o r  t r ie d  to  s te a l)  a  b o o k  fro m  th e  lib ra ry .
3 4 . N o t  in c lu d e d  o n  a d u lt  s c a le .
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Risk Perception Scale
For each of the following behaviors, circle the number that best corresponds to 
how risky or dangerous you think it is to engage in that behavior.
Not at Slightly Moderately Very Extremely
All risky risky risky risky risky
Having sex 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Drinking alcohol 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Getting drunk 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Binging/purging 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Taking speed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Shoplifting 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Driving a car 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Smoking cigarettes 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Walking alone 
at night 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Riding with
a drunk driver 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Taking prescription 
drugs as prescribed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Riding a motorcycle 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Smoking marijuana 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Having sex without 
a condom 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Driving after 
drinking 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Taking crack 
or cocaine 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Driving/riding 




or in excess 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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APPENDIX B
CODING CRITERIA 
Five dimensions of consequential thinking:
1. Benefit/Cost: Total number of REASONS TO (positive) consequences divided 
by the total number of REASONS NOT TO (negative) consequences.
2. Most important consequence considered: 1 for a REASON TO (positive) 
consequence and zero for a REASON NOT TO (negative) consequence.
3. Depth of processing: Sum the total number of REASONS TO (positive) and 
REASONS NOT TO (negative) consequences generated for each vignette.
4. Generation of solutions: Sum the number of solutions offered in response to 
each vignette.
5. Generation of acceptable solutions: Sum the number of non-delinquent, non- 
aggressive solutions.
Immature judgment factors:
Peer lnfluence-(friends opinion/influence/expectations) I f  th e  p re s e n c e  o f  
p e e rs  im p a c ts  th e i r  r e a s o n in g ] not to be left behind; peer pressure; jealous of 
friends free purchases; influenced by friends; help a friend; he’s my boy; want to 
see friend do well; made me more accepted; going along with him; my friend told 
me to; they are a friends; to be cool. DO NOT INCLUDE: Not to make a scene- 
because it does not specifically include friends/peers.
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Sensation Seeking-(anvthing that is fun, thrilling, e m o t io n a l ly  e x c it in g , etc.) 
fun; excitement; a “rush”; just to have a good time; don’t want to miss out on fun;
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immediate satisfaction; feel powerful, feeling the affects of the drugs FOR NOT 
TO Sensation Seeking must say -RUSH, THRILL.
Negative Emotion-fanvthinq that is an u n p le a s a n t  e m o t io n -RESPONDENT 
MUST FEEL- sadness, embarrassment, shame, anger, etc.) embarrassment; 
embarrassing if I get caught; rude; I am irritated/ annoyed; I was mad; he pissed 
me off; fear; guilt. DO NOT INCLUDE: “The kids are annoying” or “They are 
hurting my back.”
Risk Perception-(a judgment of risk, e x p lic it ly  l is t  a  r is k , o r  la c k  o f  r is k )  
safety; it’s dangerous; could get caught; could fight back; I could get hurt; getting 
caught; afraid to get caught; could get in trouble; could cause a fight; I won’t get 
caught; it’s easy; no chance I’d get caught; there’s cameras; getting arrested; 
could set the alarm off; get caught easily.; could get prosecuted; DO NOT 
INCLUDE: “It’s a crime to threaten someone”, because does not specify risk 
(could be moral, etc.) or “criminal prosecution” (b/c not saying they are at explicit 
risk).
Long term consequence-(anything beyond the short term...In the long 
run... N o t  th e  D IR E C T  r e s u lt  o f  th e  d e c is io n )  on my record; insurance costs; lose 
my parents trust; if I got caught I’d have to run; my mom wouldn’t trust me; I will 
go to jail and be tried as an adult; I’d have to go back to my county; hurt my 
brain; could harm my body; how much trouble I’d get in with the law and family; I 
will get community service; could get pregnant; might be grounded longer; 
reputation.
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Short term consequence-f/mmed/afe e v e n t /c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  c h o o s in g  a c t io n )  
get them to be quiet; they’ll stop kicking seat; could get kicked out of theatre; 
want to be on time; cause a scene; get caught; police get called; the situation 
could escalate; getting arrested; they will continue to talk loudly; could lose my 
job (happens immediately due to telling work-related test answer); because it’s 
free; because I get new clothes; I get to look good; they will give me the answers 
next time (explicit exchange); don’t want to look bad.
Legal consequence - (m u s t  s p e c ify  le g a l, a b o u t  th e  la w )  law; not want to 
get arrested; fights are illegal; shoplifting is a serious crime; illegal; law; I’m on 
parole.
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2. M. impt consequence:
3. Depth of processing: _
4. Gen. of alt. sol.:
5. Gen of non-agg./non-del. sol:
CODER INITIALS:
1. TEST QUESTIONS
REASONS TO GIVE THE 
QUESTIONS
REASONS NOT TO GIVE THE 
QUESTIONS
Peer Influence (0 = no; 1 = yes) Peer Influence (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Sensation Seeking (0 = no; 1 = yes) Sensation Seeking (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Negative Emotion (0 = no; 1 = yes) Negative Emotion (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Risk Perception (0 = no; 1 = yes) Risk Perception (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Long R. coneq. (0 = no; 1 = yes) Long R. coneq. (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Short T. conseq. (0 = no; 1 = yes) Short T. conseq. (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Legal conseq. (0 = no; 1 = yes) Legal conseq. (0 = no; 1 = yes)
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reviewed and approved the protocol for your study.
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year from the approval date a te*# . At the end of the approval period you will be asked 
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afl correspondence related to this study. U «. $&wishes -you success wtfo y w ’.nw M fc,
For the IRB,
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S a m p le  D e m o g ra p h ic s  In fo rm a t io n
Adolescents Adults Delinquents
Gender (% Male)2 50.4% 42.5% 73.8%
Race (% Caucasian) 75.5% 94.6% 68.9%
IQ (% 30 or above)2 87.4% 46.7%
SES1'2
% < high school degree 38.4% 8.0% 78.7%
% some college education 32.8% 42.4% 19.7%
% college degree 10.0% 18.3% 1.6%
% > some graduate education 18.8% 31.3% 0.0%
Average high school grade1,2
All A ’s 14.2% 6.1% 5.0%
Primarily A ’s and B’s 39.9% 51.0% 18.3%
All B’s 4.1% 13.8% 5.0%
Primarily B’s and C’s 24.0% 24.1% 15.0%
All C’s 2.2% 4.2% 1.7%
Primarily C’s and D’s 10.4% 0.8% 20.0%
All D’s 1.5% 0.0% 5.0%
Primarily D’s and F’s 3.0% 0.0% 10.0%
All F’s 0.7% 0.0% 15.0%
N o te . SES is a proxy based on own and partner’s or both parents’ education 
level. Average high school grade is based on adults’ average high school grade 
and adolescents’ average grade for last full year of school.
Superscript 1 = adult and adolescent differences at p < .05. Superscript 2 = 
adolescent and delinquent differences at p < .05.
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Table E2
Adjusted and Unadjusted Group Means for Components of Maturity of Judgment
for Adolescents and Adults




Resistance to Peer Influence Adolescent2 2.98 2.98a
Adult3 3.44 3.44b
Sensation Seeking Adolescent2 2.72 2.73a
Adult3 2.26 2.26b
Risk Perception Adolescent2 4.94 4.97a
Adult3 5.84 5.77b
Future-Orientation Adolescent2 2.42 2.45a
Adult3 2 . 8 6 2.83b
N o te . Adjusted means with different superscripts differ at the p  <  .05 level. 
1Mean adjusted for average grade and SES.
2n = 260,3n = 259.
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Table E3
Adjusted and Unadjusted Group Means for Spontaneously Mentioned Outcome
Expectancies as Reasons TO Engage in Antisocial Behavior for Adolescents and
Adults
Maturity of Judgment Expectancy 
as Reason TO Engage in Behavior Group Mean
Adjusted
Mean1
Peer Influence TO Adolescent2 . 2 1 .2 2 a
Adult3 .16 ,15b
Sensation Seeking TO Adolescent2 .04 .05a
Adult3 . 0 2 .0 2 b
Negative Emotion TO Adolescent2 . 1 2 ,13a
Adult3 .03 ,03b
Risk Perception TO Adolescent2 .08 ,08a
Adult3 .05 ,05b
Short Term Consequence TO Adolescent2 .30 ,31a
Adult3 .07 .06b
Long Term Consequence TO Adolescent2 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
Adult3 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
N o te . Adjusted means with different superscripts differ at the p < .05 level. 
1Mean adjusted for average grade and SES.
2n = 256, 3n = 253.
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Table E4
Adjusted and Unadjusted Group Means for Spontaneously Mentioned Outcome
Expectancies as Reasons NO T TO Engage in Antisocial Behavior for
Adolescents and Adults
Maturity of Judgment Expectancy 




Peer Influence NOT TO Adolescent2 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
Adult3 . 0 1 ,0 1 a
Sensation Seeking NOT TO Adolescent2 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
Adult3 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
Negative Emotion NOT TO Adolescent2 .08 ,09a
Adult3 .16 .14b
Risk Perception NOT TO Adolescent2 .58 ,58a
Adult3 .37 ,37b
Legal Consequence NOT TO Adolescent2 .18 ,18a
Adult3 . 2 0 ,2 0 a
Short Term Consequence NOT TO Adolescent2 .56 .56a
Adult3 .37 ,37b
Long Term Consequence NOT TO Adolescent2 .09 ,09a
Adult3 .14 ,14b
N o te . Adjusted means with different superscripts differ at the p  < .05 level. 
1Mean adjusted for average grade and SES.
2n = 256, 3n = 253.
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Table E5
Adjusted and Unadjusted Group Means for Five Factors of Consequential
Thinking for Adolescents and Adults




Total Positive Expectancies Adolescent3 2.06 2.09a
Adult4 1.14 1 .1 1 b
Operationalized Peer Influence Adolescent3 .40 ,39a
Adult4 .23 ,24b
Anticipated Peer Behavior Adolescent3 2.67 2.65a
Adult4 1.70 1.72b
Perceived Costs
Total Negative Expectancies Adolescent5 2.05 2 .1 0 a
Adult6 2.64 2.59b
Perceived Criminal Sanctions Adolescent5 2.93 2.90a
Adult6 3.13 3.15b
Care if Caught Adolescent5 3.04 3.09a
Adult6 3.72 3.67b
Reward Bias
Benefit/Cost Ratio Adolescent7 1.24 1.24a
Adult8 .47 .47b
Most Important Expectancy2 Adolescent7 .49 ,45a
Adult8 .18 ,18b
Comfort Threshold Adolescent7 57.47 57.52a
Adult8 68.56 6 8 .6 6 b
Risk Threshold Adolescent7 45.51 44.94a
Adult8 25.61 25.31b
Depth of Processing Variables
Depth of Processing Adolescent6 4.10 4.17a
Adult6 3.77 3.71b
Past Event Experience Adolescent6 3.47 3.50a
Adult6 2.76 2.81b
Alternate Solutions
Total Alternate Solutions Adolescent9 1.94 2 .0 0 a
Adult10 2.44 2.38b
Total Non Del./Agg. Solutions Adolescent9 1.64 1.69a
Adult10 2.39 2.33b
N o te . Adjusted means with different superscripts differ at the p < .05 level. 
1Mean adjusted for average grade and SES.
2Most important expectancy is rated as 1 for positive expectancy and 0 for 
negative expectancy of antisocial behavior.
3n = 238, 4n = 242, 5n = 256, 6n = 253, 7n = 201, 8n = 211, 9n = 254, 10n = 252.
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Table E6
A d ju s te d  a n d  U n a d ju s te d  G ro u p  M e a n s  fo r  M a tu r it y  o f  J u d g m e n t  C o m p o n e n ts  f o r  
A d o le s c e n t  a n d  D e l in q u e n t  Y o u th  a n d  L o w  a n d  H ig h  D e l in q u e n c y  G ro u p s
Maturity of
Judgment
Component Group Mean Adjusted Mean1
Resistance to Peer Adolescent2 2.98 2.95a
Influence Delinquent3 2.96 3.09a
Low Delinquency4 3.04 3.01a
High Delinquency5 2.91 2.95a
Sensation Seeking Adolescent 2.71 2.65a
Delinquent3 2.70 2.72a
Low Delinquency4 2.67 2.65a
High Delinquency5 2.76 2.77b
Risk Perception Adolescenr 4.96 4.90a
Delinquent3 3.42 3.68b
Low Delinquency4 5.40 5.29a
High Delinquency5 3.87 4.04b
Future-Orientation Adolescent2 2.42 2.38a
Delinquent3 2.19 2.36a
Low Delinquency4 2.57 2.49a
High Delinquency5 2.18 2.25b
N o te . Adjusted means with different superscripts differ at the p < .05 level. 
1Mean adjusted for average grade, IQ, and SES.
2n = 259, 3n = 59, 4n = 160,5n = 148.
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Table E7
Adjusted and Unadjusted Group Means for Spontaneously Mentioned Outcome
Expectancies as Reasons TO Engage in Antisocial Behavior for Adolescent and
Delinquent Youth and Low and High Delinquency Groups
Maturity of Judgment Expectancy Adjusted
as Reason TO Engage in Behavior Group Mean Mean1
Peer Influence TO Adolescent2 . 2 1 ,2 1 a
Delinquent3 . 2 0 ,25a
Low Delinquency4 . 2 0 ,19a
High Delinquency5 . 2 2 ,24a
Sensation Seeking TO Adolescent2 .04 ,04a
Delinquent3 .07 .07a
Low Delinquency4 .03 ,0 2 a
High Delinquency5 .07 .07b
Negative Emotion TO Adolescent2 . 1 2 .1 2 a
Delinquent3 .15 ,18a
Low Delinquency4 .13 ,13a
High Delinquency5 .13 ,13a
Risk Perception TO Adolescent2 .08 ,07a
Delinquent3 .06 ,07a
Low Delinquency4 .08 .06a
High Delinquency5 .08 .09a
Short Term Consequence TO Adolescent2 .30 ,29a
Delinquent3 . 2 0 ,25a
Low Delinquency4 .27 ,24a
High Delinquency5 .29 ,32a
Long Term Consequence TO Adolescent2 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
Delinquent3 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
Low Delinquency4 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
High Delinquency5 . 0 1 ,0 1 a
N o te . Adjusted means with different superscripts differ at the p  <  .05 level. 
1Mean adjusted for average grade, IQ, and SES.
2n = 256, 3n = 59, 4n = 158, 5n = 147.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table E8
Adjusted and Unadjusted Group Means for Spontaneously Mentioned Outcome
Expectancies as Reasons NOT TO Engage in Antisocial Behavior for Adolescent
and Delinquent Youth and Low and High Delinquency Groups
Maturity of Judgment Expectancy
as Reason NOT TO Engage in Adjusted
Behavior Group Mean Mean1
Peer Influence NOT TO Adolescent2 . 0 0 ,0 1 a
Delinquent3 . 0 0 ,0 1 a
Low Delinquency4 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
High Delinquency5 . 0 1 ,0 1 a
Sensation Seeking NOT TO Adolescent2 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
Delinquent3 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
Low Delinquency4 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
High Delinquency5 . 0 0 ,0 0 a
Negative Emotion NOT TO Adolescent2 .08 ,08a
Delinquent3 .05 .08a
Low Delinquency4 . 1 0 ,09a
High Delinquency5 .05 ,07a
Risk Perception NOT TO Adolescent2 .58 .56a
Delinquent3 .57 .6 6 a
Low Delinquency4 .58 ,54a
High Delinquency5 .55 .60a
Legal Consequence NOT TO Adolescent2 .18 ,18a
Delinquent3 .25 .25a
Low Delinquency4 . 2 0 ,2 1 a
High Delinquency5 .19 .18a
Short Term Consequence NOT TO Adolescent^ .56 ,54a
Delinquent3 .48 .56a
Low Delinquency4 .55 .51a
High Delinquency5 .52 .57a
Long Term Consequence NOT TO Adolescent2 .09 .09a
Delinquent3 .17 ,18a
Low Delinquency4 . 1 2 .13a
High Delinquency5 .09 ,08a
N o te . Adjusted means with different superscripts differ at the p < .05 level. 
1Mean adjusted for average grade, IQ, and SES.
2n = 256 ,3n = 59, 4n = 158 ,5n = 147.
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Table E9
A d ju s te d  a n d  U n a d ju s te d  G ro u p  M e a n s  f o r  F iv e  F a c to r s  o f  C o n s e q u e n t ia l  
T h in k in g  f o r  A d o le s c e n t  a n d  D e lin q u e n t  Y o u th  a n d  L o w  a n d  H ig h  D e lin q u e n c y  
G ro u p s




Total Positive Expectancies Adolescent3 2.06 2.05a
Delinquent4 1.90 2 .0 1 a
Low Delinquency5 1.90 1.83a
High Delinquency6 2.19 2.26b
Operationalized Peer Influence Adolescent .40 ,41a
Delinquent4 .62 .58 b
Low Delinquency^ .39 .44a
High Delinquency6 .49 .45a
Anticipated Peer Behavior Adolescent 2.67 2.71a
Delinquent4 3.36 3.27b
Low Delinquency5 2.47 2.58a
High Delinquency6 3.13 3.04b
Perceived Costs
Total Negative Expectancies Adolescent7 2.05 1.97a
Delinquent8 1.50 1.96a
Low Delinquency9 2 . 2 2 2.05a
High Delinquency10 1.65 1 .8 6 a
Perceived Criminal Sanctions Adolescent 2.93 2.93a
Delinquent8 2.93 3.01a
Low Delinquency9 3.04 3.05a
High Delinquency10 2.76 2.78b
Care if Caught Adolescent7 3.04 2.97a
Delinquent8 2.28 2.58b
Low Delinquency9 3.29 3.15a
High Delinquency10 2.46 2.64b
Reward Bias
Benefit/Cost Ratio Adolescent11 1.24 1.35a
Delinquent12 2.05 1.58a
Low Delinquency13 .97 1.15a
High Delinquency14 1 . 8 8 1.63b
Most Important Expectancy2 Adolescent11 .45 ,47a
Delinquent12 .58 ,49a
Low Delinquency13 .36 ,37a
High Delinquency14 .61 .58b
Comfort Threshold Adolescent11 57.47 56.83a
Delinquent12 52.38 54.63a
Low Delinquency13 55.37 53.023
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High Delinquency14 57.30 59.94a








Depth of Processing Variables 

























Adolescent18Total Alternate Solutions 1.94 1 .8 6 a
Delinquent8 1.55 2 .0 0 a
Low Delinquency19 
High Delinquency17










4 CQ3Low Delinquency19 1.74 1.58a
High Delinquency17 1.37 1.58a
N o te . Adjusted means with different superscripts differ at the p < .05 level.
1Mean adjusted for average grade and SES.
2Most important expectancy is rated as 1 for positive expectancy and 0 for 
negative expectancy of antisocial behavior.
3n = 238, 4n = 5 7 ,5n = 144, 6n = 143,7n = 256,8n = 5 9 ,9n = 158,10n = 147,11n = 
201 ,12n = 5 4 ,13n = 128,14n = 123,15n = 2 5 3 ,16n = 156,17n = 146,18n = 2 5 4 ,19n 
= 157.
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Table E10
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Total
Delinquency for Adolescents and Adults
Adolescents Adults
Variable B SE B B B SE B B
Step 1
Gender -4.56 2.27 -.1 1 * -.87 .38 -.14*
IQ . 2 1 . 2 0 .08
Average grade 5.46 .79 .50***
Education level -.81 .92 -.05 .03 .15 . 0 2
SES - . 1 0 .65 - . 0 1 .27 . .23 .13
Step 2
Gender - 1 . 1 2 1.89 -.03 -.32 .40 -.05
IQ . 2 1 .17 .08
Average grade 3.31 .70 .30***
Education level -.81 .76 -.05 - . 0 1 .15 . 0 0
SES -.42 .53 -.04 . 2 0 . 2 2 . 1 0
Composite of Maturity of 
Judgment Scales -16.92 2.18 _ 4 3 *** -1.76 .51 -.23**
Composite of Maturity 
of Judgment Outcome
Expectancies 2.48 10.81 . 0 1 1.87 2.78 .06
Composite Pro- 
Delinquency Consequential 
Thinking Factor 6.97 1.51 .31*** .39 .33 . 1 2
Composite Anti- 
Delinquency Consequential 
Thinking Factor - 1 . 0 2 1.36 -.05 -.08 .27 - . 0 2
N o te . Average grade is scored such that higher grades are equated with lower 
numbers. SES is a proxy based on own and partner’s or both parents’ education 
level.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Table E11
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Immature Judgment Outcome
Expectancies Predicting Pro-Delinquency Consequential Thinking for
Adolescents and Adults
Adolescents Adults
Variable B SE B B B SE B P
Step 1
Gender -.03 . 1 1 - . 0 2 -.06 . 1 2 -.03
IQ . 0 2 . 0 1 .15
Average grade .05 .04 .09
Education level .09 .05 .13 .06 .05 .15
SES - . 0 2 .03 -.05 .07 .07 . 1 0
Step 2
Gender . 0 1 . 1 0 . 0 1 -.09 .09 -.05
IQ . 0 1 . 0 1 . 1 1
Average grade .07 .03 .15*
Education level .05 .04 .07 .03 .04 .08
SES - . 0 2 .03 -.04 . 0 1 .06 . 0 2
Composite of 
Maturity of Judgment 
Outcome Expectancies 4.63 .46 .54*** 6.63 .51 54***
N o te . Average grade is scored such that higher grades are equated with lower 
numbers. SES is a proxy based on own and partner’s or both parents’ education 
level.
*p < .05. ***p < .001.
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Table E12
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Immature Judgment Outcome
Expectancies Predicting Total Delinquency for Adolescents and Adults
Adolescents Adults
Variable B SE B (3 8 SE B &
Step 1
Gender -4.56 2.27 -.1 1 * -.87 .38 -.14*
IQ . 2 1 . 2 0 .08
Average grade 5.46 .79 .50***
Education level -.81 .92 -.05 .03 .15 . 0 2
SES - . 1 0 .65 - . 0 1 .27 .23 . 1 1
Step 2
Gender -4.38 2.18 -.1 1 * -.89 .38 -.14*
IQ .17 . 2 0 .06
Average grade 5.76 .76 .53***
Education level -.130 .89 -.08 . 0 0 .15 . 0 0
SES -.03 .62 . 0 0 .23 .23 . 1 1
Composite of 
Maturity of Judgment 
Outcome Expectancies 47.49 10.44 .25*** 5.12 2.13 .15*
N o te . Average grade is scored such that higher grades are equated with lower 
numbers. SES is a proxy based on own and partner’s or both parents’ education 
level.
*p< .05. * * * p <  .001.
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Table E13
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Immature Judgment Outcome
Expectancies and Pro-Delinquency Consequential Thinking Predicting Total
Delinquency for Adolescents and Adults
Adolescents Adults
Variable B SE B P B SE B P
Step 1
Gender -4.57 2.27 -.1 1 * -.87 .38 -.14*
IQ . 2 1 . 2 0 .08
Average grade 5.46 .79 .50***
Education level -.81 .92 -.05 .03 .15 . 0 2
SES - . 1 0 .65 - . 0 1 .27 .23 .13
Step 2
Gender -4.40 2.09 -.1 1 * -.85 .38 -.14*
IQ . 1 1 .19 .04
Average grade 5.33 .73 4g***
Education level -1.58 . 8 6 - . 1 0 - . 0 1 .15 - . 0 1
SES . 1 0 .60 . 0 1 .23 .23 . 1 1
Composite of 
Maturity of Judgment 
Outcome Expectancies 17.47 11.99 .09 2.34 2.76 .07
Step 3
Gender -4.4 2.09 -.1 1 * -.85 .38 -.14*
IQ . 1 1 .19 .04
Average grade 5.33 .73 49***
Education level -1.58 . 8 6 - . 1 0 - 1 . 1 1 .15 - . 0 1
SES .09 .60 . 0 1 .23 .23 • 1 1
Composite of 
Maturity of Judgment 




Factor 6.37 1.40 .29*** .42 .27 .13
N o te . Average grade is scored such that higher grades are equated with lower 
numbers. SES is a proxy based on own and partner’s or both parents’ education 
level.
*p < .05. ***p < .001.
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Table E14
S u m m a ry  o f  O L S  R e g re s s io n  A n a ly s e s  P re d ic t in g  T o ta l D e l in q u e n c y  fo r  
A d o le s c e n ts  a n d  A d u lts
M o d e l 1 S t.
Variable B SE B 3 B
Step 1
Adolescent or no 18.40 2.82 .56*** 84***
Gender - 1 . 1 2 1.29 -.03 -.03
Ave. grade 3.91 .49 .34*** 2 7 ***
Ed. Level .55 .41 .13 . 1 0
SES -.87 .47 - . 1 0 -.08
Step 2
Adolescent or no 3.07 2 . 8 6 .09 .14
Gender .72 1.15 . 0 2 . 0 2
Ave. grade 2.43 .45 2  "| *** -j 7 ***
Ed. Level -.13 .37 -.03 i b N>
SES -.24 .41 -.03 - . 0 2
Total pos. exp. 2.52 .67 .16***  ^2 ***
Total costs -.93 .62 -.06 -.05
Most impt. expect. 1.82 1 . 8 6 .04 .03
Ant. Peer behavior 2.54 1 . 1 0 .1 2 * b CO *
Crim. Sanctions .76 .91 .03 .03
Care if caught -6.53 1.18 _ 28*** 22***
Risk threshold .03 . 0 2 .05 .04




N o te . Average grade is scored such that higher grades are equated with lower 
numbers. SES is a proxy based on own and partner’s or both parents’ education 
level.
* p  < .05. **p < .01. * * *  p  < .001.
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Table E14 Continued
S u m m a ry  o f  O L S  R e g re s s io n  A n a ly s e s  P re d ic t in g  T o ta l D e l in q u e n c y  fo r  
A d o le s c e n ts  a n d  A d u lts
M o d . 2 M o d . 3 M o d . 4 M o d . 5
Variable B B B B
Step 1
Adolescent or no 34*** 34*** 3 4 *** 3 4 ***
Gender -.03 -.03 -.03 -.03
Ave. grade 2 7 *** 2 7 *** 2 7 *** 2 7 ***
Ed. Level . 1 0 . 1 0 . 1 0 . 1 0
SES -.08 -.08 -.08 -.08
Step 3
Adolescent or no .07 .17 .16 .17
Gender . 0 1 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0 1
Ave. grade 16***  ^7*** .16*** .15***
Ed. Level -.04 - . 0 2 -.04 -.03
SES . 0 1 - . 0 2 - . 0 1 - . 0 2
Total pos. exp. . 0 0 .13*** .13*** .13***
Total costs -.05 - . 0 1 -.03 -.04
Most impt. expect. .03 .03 -.06 . 0 2
Ant. Peer behavior o CO * o to * .09 .05
Crim. Sanctions .03 .03 .04 . 0 2
Care if caught _ 2 3 *** 2"j *** -.2 0 *** .2 0 ***
Risk threshold .04 .04 .03 .04
Past experience .09** .09** .09** .09**
Total pos. exp. X 
Adolescence
.34***
Total costs x -.09
Adolescence
Most impt. exp. x 
Adolescence
2 7 ***
Ant. Peer behavior .31***
x Adolescence
Model F? .57*** .54 .56*** .56***
(adjusted)
Model F 41.06 35.98 38.93 38.85
N o te . Average grade is scored such that higher grades are equated with lower 
numbers. SES is a proxy based on own and partner’s or both parents’ education 
level.
*p<  .05. **p< .01. * **p <  .001.
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Table E14 Continued
S u m m a ry  o f  O L S  R e g re s s io n  A n a ly s e s  P re d ic t in g  T o ta l D e l in q u e n c y  fo r  
A d o le s c e n ts  a n d  A d u l ts
M o d . 6 M o d . 7 M o d . 8 M o d . 9
Variable B B B B
Step 1
Adolescent or no 84*** 8 4 *** 8 4 *** 84***
Gender -.03 -.03 -.03 -.03
Ave. grade 2 7 *** 2 7 *** 2 7 *** 2 7 ***
Ed. Level . 1 0 . 1 0 . 1 0 . 1 0
SES -.08 -.08 -.08 -.08
Step 3
Adolescent or no .17 .25* .13 .25
Gender . 0 2 . 0 1 . 0 2 .71
Ave. grade -j 7*** -| 4 *** .16*** .16***
Ed. Level - . 0 1 - . 0 2 -.03 -.04
SES - . 0 2 - . 0 1 - . 0 2 - . 0 1
Total pos. exp. .13*** <| ^*** .13***  ^2  ***
Total costs -.05 -.04 -.05 -.03
Most impt. expect. .03 .03 .03 . 0 2
Ant. peer behavior .09*
*COo .09* .06
Criminal sanctions .06 . 0 2 .03 .04
Care if caught 2-j *** .09 22*** 22***
Risk threshold .03 .04 - . 0 2 .03
Past experience .09** .09** .09** - . 0 2
Crim. sanctions x -.07
Adolescence
Care if caught x 
Adolescence
- 42***
Risk threshold x .1 2 *
Adolescence
Past experience x 
Adolescence
.32***
Model R2 .55 .57*** .54*** .57***
(adjusted)
Model F 38.84 41.38 36.34 40.48
N o te . Average grade is scored such that higher grades are equated with lower 
numbers. SES is a proxy based on own and partner’s or both parents’ education 
level.
*p < .05. **p < .01. *** p  < .001.
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Total DelinquencyImmature Judgment 
Outcome Expectancies
N o te . The initial path between immature judgment and delinquency is indicated 
by the beta-weight on top of the line connecting these variables. The beta-weight 
after pro-delinquency consequential thinking is included as the mediator is 
indicated by the value directly under the path.
***p< .001.
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Figure F2.






Total DelinquencyImmature Judgment 
Outcome Expectancies
N o te . The initial path between immature judgment and delinquency is indicated 
by the beta-weight on top of the line connecting these variables. The beta-weight 
after pro-delinquency consequential thinking is included as the mediator is 
indicated by the value directly under the path.
*p<  .05. ***p< .001.
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Plot of total positive expectancies by adolescence interaction.

































Anticipated Peer Antisocial Behavior
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How Much Care if Caught
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